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<!DOCTYPE rfc [
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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-tls-esni-25" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" number="9849" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.28.1 3.31.0 -->
  <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni-25" rel="prev"/>
  <front>
    <title abbrev="TLS Encrypted Client Hello">TLS Encrypted Client Hello</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-esni-25"/> name="RFC" value="9849"/>
    <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
      <organization>Independent</organization>
      <organization>Knight-Georgetown Institute</organization>
      <address>
        <email>ekr@rtfm.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="K." surname="Oku" fullname="Kazuho Oku">
      <organization>Fastly</organization>
      <address>
        <email>kazuhooku@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="N." surname="Sullivan" fullname="Nick Sullivan">
      <organization>Cryptography Consulting LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <email>nicholas.sullivan+ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
      <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      <address>
        <email>caw@heapingbits.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2025" month="June" day="14"/> month="December"/>
    <area>SEC</area>
    <workgroup>tls</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 67?> 108?>

<!-- [rfced] References

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Note that WHATWG provides "commit snapshots" of their living standards and
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[WHATWG-IPV4]
           WHATWG, "URL - IPv4 Parser", WHATWG Living Standard, May
           2021, <https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-ipv4-parser>.

d) FYI, RFCYYY1 (draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech) will be updated during the XML stage.

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<!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in
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<t>This document describes a mechanism in Transport Layer Security (TLS) for
encrypting a ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> message under a server public key.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>Discussion Venues</name>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
  <eref target="https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni">https://github.com/tlswg/draft-ietf-tls-esni</eref>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 72?> 141?>

<section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Although TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/> encrypts most of the handshake, including the
server certificate, there are several ways in which an on-path attacker can
learn private information about the connection. The plaintext Server Name
Indication (SNI) extension in ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> messages, which leaks the target
domain for a given connection, is perhaps the most sensitive information
left unencrypted in TLS 1.3.</t>
      <t>This document specifies a new TLS extension, extension called Encrypted Client
Hello
(ECH), (ECH) that allows clients to encrypt their ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> to the
TLS server.  This protects the SNI and other potentially sensitive
fields, such as the
Application Layer Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) list
<xref target="RFC7301"/>. Co-located servers with consistent externally visible
TLS configurations and behavior, including supported versions and cipher suites and
how they respond to incoming client connections, form an anonymity set. (Note
that implementation-specific choices, such as extension ordering within TLS
messages or division of data into record-layer boundaries, can result in
different externally visible behavior, even for servers with consistent TLS
configurations.) Usage of this mechanism reveals that a client is connecting
to a particular service provider, but does not reveal which server from the
anonymity set terminates the connection. Deployment implications of this
feature are discussed in <xref target="deployment"/>.</t>
      <t>ECH is not in itself sufficient to protect the identity of the server.
The target domain may also be visible through other channels, such as
plaintext client DNS queries or visible server IP addresses. However,
encrypted DNS mechanisms such as
DNS over HTTPS <xref target="RFC8484"/>, DNS over TLS/DTLS <xref target="RFC7858"/> <xref target="RFC8094"/>, and
DNS over QUIC <xref target="RFC9250"/>
provide mechanisms for clients to conceal
DNS lookups from network inspection, and many TLS servers host multiple domains
on the same IP address. Private origins may also be deployed behind a common
provider, such as a reverse proxy. In such environments, the SNI remains the
primary explicit signal available to observers to determine the
server's identity.</t>
      <t>ECH is supported in TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/>, DTLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC9147"/>, and
newer versions of the TLS and DTLS protocols.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. All TLS
notation comes from <xref section="3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <t>This protocol is designed to operate in one of two topologies illustrated below,
which we call "Shared Mode" and "Split Mode". These modes are described in the
following section.</t>
      <section anchor="topologies">
        <name>Topologies</name>
        <figure anchor="shared-mode">
          <name>Shared Mode Topology</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
                +---------------------+
                |                     |
                |   2001:DB8::1111    |
                |                     |
Client <----->  | private.example.org |
                |                     |
                | public.example.com  |
                |                     |
                +---------------------+
                        Server
          (Client-Facing and Backend Combined)
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>In Shared Mode, shared mode, the provider is the origin server for all the domains whose DNS
records point to it. In this mode, the TLS connection is terminated by the
provider.</t>
        <figure anchor="split-mode">
          <name>Split Mode Topology</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
           +--------------------+     +---------------------+
           |                    |     |                     |
           |   2001:DB8::1111   |     |   2001:DB8::EEEE    |
Client <----------------------------->|                     |
           | public.example.com |     | private.example.org |
           |                    |     |                     |
           +--------------------+     +---------------------+
            Client-Facing Server            Backend Server
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>In Split Mode, split mode, the provider is not the origin server for private domains.
Rather, the DNS records for private domains point to the provider, and the
provider's server relays the connection back to the origin server, who
terminates the TLS connection with the client. Importantly, the service provider
does not have access to the plaintext of the connection beyond the unencrypted
portions of the handshake.</t>
        <t>In the remainder of this document, we will refer to the ECH-service provider as
the "client-facing server" and to the TLS terminator as the "backend server".
These are the same entity in Shared Mode, shared mode, but in Split Mode, split mode, the client-facing
and backend servers are physically separated.</t>
        <t>See <xref target="security-considerations"/> for more discussion about the ECH threat model
and how it relates to the client, client-facing server, and backend server.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="encrypted-clienthello-ech">
        <name>Encrypted ClientHello (ECH)</name>
        <t>A client-facing server enables ECH by publishing an ECH configuration, which
is an encryption public key and associated metadata. Domains which wish to
use ECH must publish this configuration, using the key associated
with the client-facing server. This document
defines the ECH configuration's format, but delegates DNS publication details
to <xref target="RFC9460"/>. See
<xref target="ECH-IN-DNS"/> target="RFCYYY1"/> for specifics about how ECH configurations
are advertised in SVCB and HTTPS records. Other delivery mechanisms are
also possible. For example, the client may have the ECH configuration
preconfigured.</t>
        <t>When a client wants to establish a TLS session with some backend server, it
constructs a private ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>, referred to as the ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.
The client then constructs a public ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>, referred to as the
ClientHelloOuter.
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. The ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> contains innocuous values for
sensitive extensions and an "encrypted_client_hello" extension
(<xref target="encrypted-client-hello"/>), which carries the encrypted ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.
Finally, the client sends ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to the server.</t>
        <t>The server takes one of the following actions:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>If it does not support ECH or cannot decrypt the extension, it completes
the handshake with ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. This is referred to as rejecting ECH.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If it successfully decrypts the extension, it forwards the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>
to the backend server, which completes the handshake. This is referred to
as accepting ECH.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Upon receiving the server's response, the client determines whether or not ECH
was accepted (<xref target="determining-ech-acceptance"/>) and proceeds with the handshake
accordingly. When ECH is rejected, the resulting connection is not usable by
the client for application data. Instead, ECH rejection allows the client to
retry with up-to-date configuration (<xref target="rejected-ech"/>).</t>
        <t>The primary goal of ECH is to ensure that connections to servers in the same
anonymity set are indistinguishable from one another. Moreover, it should
achieve this goal without affecting any existing security properties of TLS 1.3.
See <xref target="goals"/> for more details about the ECH security and privacy goals.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ech-configuration">
      <name>Encrypted ClientHello Configuration</name>
      <t>ECH uses HPKE Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) for public key encryption <xref target="HPKE"/>. target="RFC9180"/>.
The ECH configuration is defined by the following <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
    opaque HpkePublicKey<1..2^16-1>;
    uint16 HpkeKemId;              // Defined in RFC9180 RFC 9180
    uint16 HpkeKdfId;              // Defined in RFC9180 RFC 9180
    uint16 HpkeAeadId;             // Defined in RFC9180 RFC 9180
    uint16 ECHConfigExtensionType; // Defined in Section 11.3

    struct {
        HpkeKdfId kdf_id;
        HpkeAeadId aead_id;
    } HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite;

    struct {
        uint8 config_id;
        HpkeKemId kem_id;
        HpkePublicKey public_key;
        HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suites<4..2^16-4>;
    } HpkeKeyConfig;

    struct {
        ECHConfigExtensionType type;
        opaque data<0..2^16-1>;
    } ECHConfigExtension;

    struct {
        HpkeKeyConfig key_config;
        uint8 maximum_name_length;
        opaque public_name<1..255>;
        ECHConfigExtension extensions<0..2^16-1>;
    } ECHConfigContents;

    struct {
        uint16 version;
        uint16 length;
        select (ECHConfig.version) {
          case 0xfe0d: ECHConfigContents contents;
        }
    } ECHConfig;
]]></artwork>
      <t>The structure contains the following fields:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>version</dt>
        <dt>version:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The version of ECH for which this configuration is used. The version
is the same as the code point for the
"encrypted_client_hello" extension. Clients MUST ignore any <tt>ECHConfig</tt>
structure with a version they do not support.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>length</dt>
        <dt>length:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The length, in bytes, of the next field. This length field allows
implementations to skip over the elements in such a list where they cannot
parse the specific version of ECHConfig.</t> <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>contents</dt>
        <dt>contents:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An opaque byte string whose contents depend on the version. For this
specification, the contents are an <tt>ECHConfigContents</tt> structure.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>The <tt>ECHConfigContents</tt> structure contains the following fields:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>key_config</dt>
        <dt>key_config:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A <tt>HpkeKeyConfig</tt> structure carrying the configuration information
associated with the HPKE public key (an "ECH key"). Note that this
structure contains the <tt>config_id</tt> field, which applies to the entire
ECHConfigContents.</t>
<tt>ECHConfigContents</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>maximum_name_length</dt>
        <dt><tt>maximum_name_length</tt>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The longest name of a backend server, if known. If not known, this value can
be set to zero. It is used to compute padding (<xref target="padding"/>) and does not
constrain server name lengths. Names may exceed this length if, e.g.,
the server uses wildcard names or added new names to the anonymity set.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>public_name</dt>
        <dt>public_name:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The DNS name of the client-facing server, i.e., the entity trusted
to update the ECH configuration. This is used to correct misconfigured clients,
as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt/>
        <dd>
          <t>See <xref target="auth-public-name"/> for how the client interprets and validates the
public_name.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>extensions</dt>
        <dt>extensions:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A list of ECHConfigExtension values that the client must take into
consideration when generating a ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> message. Each ECHConfigExtension
has a 2-octet type and opaque data value, where the data value is encoded
with a 2-octet integer representing the length of the data, in network byte
order. ECHConfigExtension values are described below (<xref target="config-extensions"/>).</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>The <tt>HpkeKeyConfig</tt> structure contains the following fields:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>config_id</dt>
        <dt><tt>config_id</tt>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A one-byte identifier for the given HPKE key configuration. This is used by
clients to indicate the key used for ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> encryption. <xref target="config-ids"/>
describes how client-facing servers allocate this value.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>kem_id</dt>
        <dt>kem_id:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The HPKE Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) identifier corresponding
to <tt>public_key</tt>. Clients MUST ignore any <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure with a
key using a KEM they do not support.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>public_key</dt>
        <dt><tt>public_key</tt>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The HPKE public key used by the client to encrypt ClientHelloInner.</t> <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>cipher_suites</dt>
        <dt>cipher_suites:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The list of HPKE KDF Key Derivation Function (KDF) and AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) identifier pairs clients can use for encrypting
ClientHelloInner.
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. See <xref target="real-ech"/> for how clients choose from this list.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>The client-facing server advertises a sequence of ECH configurations to clients,
serialized as follows.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
    ECHConfig ECHConfigList<4..2^16-1>;
]]></artwork>
      <t>The <tt>ECHConfigList</tt> structure contains one or more <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures in
decreasing order of preference. This allows a server to support multiple
versions of ECH and multiple sets of ECH parameters.</t>
      <section anchor="config-ids">
        <name>Configuration Identifiers</name>
        <t>A client-facing server has a set of known ECHConfig values, <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values with corresponding
private keys. This set SHOULD contain the currently published values, as well as
previous values that may still be in use, since clients may cache DNS records
up to a TTL or longer.</t>
        <t><xref target="client-facing-server"/> describes a trial decryption process for decrypting the
ClientHello.
<tt>ClientHello</tt>. This can impact performance when the client-facing server maintains
many known ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values. To avoid this, the client-facing server SHOULD
allocate distinct <tt>config_id</tt> values for each ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> in its known set. The
RECOMMENDED strategy is via rejection sampling, i.e., to randomly select
<tt>config_id</tt> repeatedly until it does not match any known ECHConfig.</t> <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t>
        <t>It is not necessary for <tt>config_id</tt> values across different client-facing
servers to be distinct. A backend server may be hosted behind two different
client-facing servers with colliding <tt>config_id</tt> values without any performance
impact. Values may also be reused if the previous ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> is no longer in the
known set.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="config-extensions">
        <name>Configuration Extensions</name>
        <t>ECH configuration extensions are used to provide room for additional
functionality as needed. The format is as defined in
<xref target="ech-configuration"/> and mirrors <xref section="4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>. However,
ECH configuration extension types are maintained by IANA as described
in <xref target="config-extensions-iana"/>.  ECH configuration extensions follow
the same interpretation rules as TLS extensions: extensions MAY appear
in any order, but there MUST NOT be more than one extension of the
same type in the extensions block. Unlike TLS extensions, an extension
can be tagged as mandatory by using an extension type codepoint with
the high order bit set to 1.</t>
        <t>Clients MUST parse the extension list and check for unsupported mandatory
extensions. If an unsupported mandatory extension is present, clients MUST
ignore the <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t>
        <t>Any future information or hints that influence ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> SHOULD be
specified as ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> extensions. This is primarily because the outer
ClientHello
<tt>ClientHello</tt> exists only in support of ECH. Namely, it is both an envelope for
the encrypted inner ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> and an enabler for authenticated key mismatch
signals (see <xref target="server-behavior"/>). In contrast, the inner ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> is the
true ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> used upon ECH negotiation.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="encrypted-client-hello">
      <name>The "encrypted_client_hello" Extension</name>
      <t>To offer ECH, the client sends an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in the
ClientHelloOuter.
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. When it does, it MUST also send the extension in
ClientHelloInner.</t>
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
    enum {
       encrypted_client_hello(0xfe0d), (65535)
    } ExtensionType;
]]></artwork>
      <t>The payload of the extension has the following structure:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
    enum { outer(0), inner(1) } ECHClientHelloType;

    struct {
       ECHClientHelloType type;
       select (ECHClientHello.type) {
           case outer:
               HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite cipher_suite;
               uint8 config_id;
               opaque enc<0..2^16-1>;
               opaque payload<1..2^16-1>;
           case inner:
               Empty;
       };
    } ECHClientHello;
]]></artwork>
      <t>The outer extension uses the <tt>outer</tt> variant and the inner extension uses the
<tt>inner</tt> variant. The inner extension has an empty payload, which is included
because TLS servers are not allowed to provide extensions in ServerHello
which were not included in ClientHello. <tt>ClientHello</tt>. The outer extension has the following
fields:</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>config_id</dt>
        <dt><tt>config_id</tt>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The ECHConfigContents.key_config.config_id <tt>ECHConfigContents.key_config.config_id</tt> for the chosen ECHConfig.</t> <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>cipher_suite</dt>
        <dt><tt>cipher_suite</tt>:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The cipher suite used to encrypt ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. This MUST match a value
provided in the corresponding <tt>ECHConfigContents.cipher_suites</tt> list.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>enc</dt>
        <dt>enc:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The HPKE encapsulated key, key used by servers to decrypt the corresponding
<tt>payload</tt> field. This field is empty in a ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> sent in response to
HelloRetryRequest.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>payload</dt>
        <dt>payload:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The serialized and encrypted EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> structure, encrypted
using HPKE as described in <xref target="real-ech"/>.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>When a client offers the <tt>outer</tt> version of an "encrypted_client_hello"
extension, the server MAY include an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its
EncryptedExtensions message, as described in <xref target="client-facing-server"/>, with the
following payload:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
    struct {
       ECHConfigList retry_configs;
    } ECHEncryptedExtensions;
]]></artwork>
      <t>The response is valid only when the server used the ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. If the
server sent this extension in response to the <tt>inner</tt> variant, then the client
MUST abort with an "unsupported_extension" alert.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>retry_configs</dt>
        <dt>retry_configs:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>An ECHConfigList <tt>ECHConfigList</tt> structure containing one or more ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures, in
decreasing order of preference, to be used by the client as described in
<xref target="rejected-ech"/>. These are known as the server's "retry configurations".</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Finally, when the client offers the "encrypted_client_hello", if the payload is
the <tt>inner</tt> variant and the server responds with HelloRetryRequest, it MUST
include an "encrypted_client_hello" extension with the following payload:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
    struct {
       opaque confirmation[8];
    } ECHHelloRetryRequest;
]]></artwork>
      <t>The value of ECHHelloRetryRequest.confirmation is set to
<tt>hrr_accept_confirmation</tt> as described in <xref target="backend-server-hrr"/>.</t>
      <t>This document also defines the "ech_required" alert, which the client MUST send
when it offered an "encrypted_client_hello" extension that was not accepted by
the server. (See <xref target="alerts"/>.)</t>
      <section anchor="encoding-inner">
        <name>Encoding the ClientHelloInner</name>
        <t>Before encrypting, the client pads and optionally compresses ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>
into a EncodedClientHelloInner an <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> structure, defined below:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
    struct {
        ClientHello client_hello;
        uint8 zeros[length_of_padding];
    } EncodedClientHelloInner;
]]></artwork>
        <t>The <tt>client_hello</tt> field is computed by first making a copy of ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>
and setting the <tt>legacy_session_id</tt> field to the empty string. In TLS, this
field uses the ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> structure defined in <xref section="4.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>.
In DTLS, it uses the ClientHello structured <tt>ClientHello</tt> structure defined in
<xref section="5.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9147"/>. This does not include Handshake structure's
four-byte header in TLS, nor twelve-byte header in DTLS. The <tt>zeros</tt> field MUST
be all zeroes of length <tt>length_of_padding</tt> (see <xref target="padding"/>).</t>
        <t>Repeating large extensions, such as "key_share" with post-quantum algorithms,
between ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> and ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> can lead to excessive size. To
reduce the size impact, the client MAY substitute extensions which it knows
will be duplicated in ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It does so by removing and replacing
extensions from EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> with a single "ech_outer_extensions"
extension, defined as follows:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
    enum {
       ech_outer_extensions(0xfd00), (65535)
    } ExtensionType;

    ExtensionType OuterExtensions<2..254>;
]]></artwork>
        <t>OuterExtensions contains the removed ExtensionType values. Each value references
the matching extension in ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. The values MUST be ordered
contiguously in ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, and the "ech_outer_extensions" extension MUST
be inserted in the corresponding position in EncodedClientHelloInner. <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>.
Additionally, the extensions MUST appear in ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> in the same
relative order. However, there is no requirement that they be contiguous. For
example, OuterExtensions may contain extensions A, B, and C, while ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
contains extensions A, D, B, C, E, and F.</t>
        <t>The "ech_outer_extensions" extension can only be included in
EncodedClientHelloInner,
<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> and MUST NOT appear in either ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> or
ClientHelloInner.</t>
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t>
        <t>Finally, the client pads the message by setting the <tt>zeros</tt> field to a byte
string whose contents are all zeros and whose length is the amount of padding
to add. <xref target="padding"/> describes a recommended padding scheme.</t>
        <t>The client-facing server computes ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> by reversing this process.
First
First, it parses EncodedClientHelloInner, <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, interpreting all bytes after
<tt>client_hello</tt> as padding. If any padding byte is non-zero, the server MUST
abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
        <t>Next
        <t>Next, it makes a copy of the <tt>client_hello</tt> field and copies the
<tt>legacy_session_id</tt> field from ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It then looks for an
"ech_outer_extensions" extension. If found, it replaces the extension with the
corresponding sequence of extensions in the ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. The server MUST
abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert if any of the following
are true:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Any referenced extension is missing in ClientHelloOuter.</t> <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Any extension is referenced in OuterExtensions more than once.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>"encrypted_client_hello" is referenced in OuterExtensions.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The extensions in ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> corresponding to those in OuterExtensions
do not occur in the same order.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>These requirements prevent an attacker from performing a packet amplification
attack,
attack by crafting a ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> which decompresses to a much larger
ClientHelloInner.
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. This is discussed further in <xref target="decompression-amp"/>.</t>
        <t>Implementations SHOULD construct the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> in linear
time. Quadratic time implementations (such as may happen via naive
copying) create a denial of service denial-of-service risk.
<xref target="linear-outer-extensions"/> describes a linear-time procedure that may be used
for this purpose.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="authenticating-outer">
        <name>Authenticating the ClientHelloOuter</name>
        <t>To prevent a network attacker from modifying the <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
while keeping the same encrypted <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>
(see <xref target="flow-clienthello-malleability"/>), ECH authenticates ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
by passing ClientHelloOuterAAD <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> as the associated data for HPKE sealing
and opening operations. The ClientHelloOuterAAD <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> is a serialized
ClientHello
<tt>ClientHello</tt> structure, defined in <xref section="4.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/> for TLS and
<xref section="5.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9147"/> for DTLS, which matches the ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> except
that the <tt>payload</tt> field of the "encrypted_client_hello" is replaced with a byte
string of the same length but whose contents are zeros. This value does not
include Handshake structure's four-byte header in TLS nor twelve-byte header in
DTLS.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="client-behavior">
      <name>Client Behavior</name>
      <t>Clients that implement the ECH extension behave in one of two ways: either they
offer a real ECH extension, as described in <xref target="real-ech"/>; target="real-ech"/>, or they send a
Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) <xref target="RFC8701"/>
ECH extension, as described in <xref target="grease-ech"/>. Clients of the latter type do not
negotiate ECH. Instead, they generate a dummy ECH extension that is ignored by
the server. (See <xref target="dont-stick-out"/> for an explanation.) The client offers ECH
if it is in possession of a compatible ECH configuration and sends GREASE ECH
(see <xref target="grease-ech"/>) otherwise.</t>
      <section anchor="real-ech">
        <name>Offering ECH</name>
        <t>To offer ECH, the client first chooses a suitable ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> from the server's
ECHConfigList.
<tt>ECHConfigList</tt>. To determine if a given <tt>ECHConfig</tt> is suitable, it checks that
it supports the KEM algorithm identified by <tt>ECHConfig.contents.kem_id</tt>, at
least one KDF/AEAD algorithm identified by <tt>ECHConfig.contents.cipher_suites</tt>,
and the version of ECH indicated by <tt>ECHConfig.contents.version</tt>. Once a
suitable configuration is found, the client selects the cipher suite it will
use for encryption. It MUST NOT choose a cipher suite or version not advertised
by the configuration. If no compatible configuration is found, then the client
SHOULD proceed as described in <xref target="grease-ech"/>.</t>
        <t>Next, the client constructs the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> message just as it does a
standard ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>, with the exception of the following rules:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>It MUST NOT offer to negotiate TLS 1.2 or below. This is necessary to ensure
the backend server does not negotiate a TLS version that is incompatible with
ECH.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It MUST NOT offer to resume any session for TLS 1.2 and below.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If it intends to compress any extensions (see <xref target="encoding-inner"/>), it MUST
order those extensions consecutively.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It MUST include the "encrypted_client_hello" extension of type <tt>inner</tt> as
described in <xref target="encrypted-client-hello"/>. (This requirement is not applicable
when the "encrypted_client_hello" extension is generated as described in
<xref target="grease-ech"/>.)</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The client then constructs EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> as described in
<xref target="encoding-inner"/>. It also computes an HPKE encryption context and <tt>enc</tt> value
as:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
    pkR = DeserializePublicKey(ECHConfig.contents.public_key)
    enc, context = SetupBaseS(pkR,
                              "tls ech" || 0x00 || ECHConfig)
]]></artwork>
        <t>Next, it constructs a partial ClientHelloOuterAAD <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> as it does a standard
ClientHello,
<tt>ClientHello</tt>, with the exception of the following rules:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>It MUST offer to negotiate TLS 1.3 or above.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If it compressed any extensions in EncodedClientHelloInner, <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, it MUST copy the
corresponding extensions from ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. The copied extensions
additionally MUST be in the same relative order as in ClientHelloInner.</t> <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It MUST copy the legacy_session_id field from ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. This
allows the server to echo the correct session ID for TLS 1.3's compatibility
mode (see <xref section="D.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>) when ECH is negotiated. Note that
compatibility mode is not used in DTLS 1.3, but following this rule will
produce the correct results for both TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It MAY copy any other field from the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> except
ClientHelloInner.random.
<tt>ClientHelloInner.random</tt>. Instead, It it MUST generate a fresh
ClientHelloOuter.random
<tt>ClientHelloOuter.random</tt> using a secure random number generator. (See
<xref target="flow-client-reaction"/>.)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>It SHOULD place the value of <tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt> in the
"server_name" extension. Clients that do not follow this step, or place a
different value in the "server_name" extension, risk breaking the retry
mechanism described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/> or failing to interoperate with
servers that require this step to be done; see <xref target="client-facing-server"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>When the client offers the "pre_shared_key" extension in ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, it
SHOULD also include a GREASE "pre_shared_key" extension in ClientHelloOuter, <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>,
generated in the manner described in <xref target="grease-psk"/>. The client MUST NOT use
this extension to advertise a PSK to the client-facing server. (See
<xref target="flow-clienthello-malleability"/>.) When the client includes a GREASE
"pre_shared_key" extension, it MUST also copy the "psk_key_exchange_modes"
from the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> into the ClientHelloOuter.</t> <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>When the client offers the "early_data" extension in ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, it
MUST also include the "early_data" extension in ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. This
allows servers that reject ECH and use ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to safely ignore any
early data sent by the client per <xref section="4.2.10" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The client might duplicate non-sensitive extensions in both messages. However,
implementations need to take care to ensure that sensitive extensions are not
offered in the ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. See <xref target="outer-clienthello"/> for additional
guidance.</t>
        <t>Finally, the client encrypts the EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> with the above values,
as described in <xref target="encrypting-clienthello"/>, to construct a ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It
sends this to the server, server and processes the response as described in
<xref target="determining-ech-acceptance"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="encrypting-clienthello">
          <name>Encrypting the ClientHello</name>
          <t>Given an EncodedClientHelloInner, <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, an HPKE encryption context and <tt>enc</tt> value,
and a partial ClientHelloOuterAAD, <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt>, the client constructs a ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as
follows.</t>
          <t>First, the client determines the length L of encrypting EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>
with the selected HPKE AEAD. This is typically the sum of the plaintext length
and the AEAD tag length. The client then completes the ClientHelloOuterAAD <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> with
an "encrypted_client_hello" extension. This extension value contains the outer
variant of ECHClientHello <tt>ECHClientHello</tt> with the following fields:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t><tt>config_id</tt>, the identifier corresponding to the chosen ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>cipher_suite</tt>, the client's chosen cipher suite;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>enc</tt>, as given above; and</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t><tt>payload</tt>, a placeholder byte string containing L zeros.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>If configuration identifiers (see <xref target="ignored-configs"/>) are to be
ignored, <tt>config_id</tt> SHOULD be set to a randomly generated byte in the
first ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> and, in the event of a HelloRetryRequest (HRR),
MUST be left unchanged for the second ClientHelloOuter.</t> <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t>
          <t>The client serializes this structure to construct the ClientHelloOuterAAD. <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt>.
It then computes the final payload as:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
    final_payload = context.Seal(ClientHelloOuterAAD,
                                 EncodedClientHelloInner)
]]></artwork>
          <t>Including <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> as the HPKE AAD binds the <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
to the <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, thus preventing attackers from modifying
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> while keeping the same <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, as described in
<xref target="flow-clienthello-malleability"/>.</t>
          <t>Finally, the client replaces <tt>payload</tt> with <tt>final_payload</tt> to obtain
ClientHelloOuter.
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. The two values have the same length, so it is not necessary
to recompute length prefixes in the serialized structure.</t>
          <t>Note this construction requires the "encrypted_client_hello" be computed after
all other extensions. This is possible because the ClientHelloOuter's <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>'s
"pre_shared_key" extension is either omitted, omitted or uses a random binder
(<xref target="grease-psk"/>).</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="grease-psk">
          <name>GREASE PSK</name>
          <t>When offering ECH, the client is not permitted to advertise PSK identities in
the ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. However, the client can send a "pre_shared_key" extension
in the ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. In this case, when resuming a session with the client,
the backend server sends a "pre_shared_key" extension in its ServerHello. This
would appear to a network observer as if the server were sending this
extension without solicitation, which would violate the extension rules
described in <xref target="RFC8446"/>. When offering a PSK in ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>,
clients SHOULD send a GREASE "pre_shared_key" extension in the
ClientHelloOuter
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to make it appear to the network as if the extension were
negotiated properly.</t>
          <t>The client generates the extension payload by constructing an <tt>OfferedPsks</tt>
structure (see <xref section="4.2.11" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>) as follows. For each PSK identity
advertised in the ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the client generates a random PSK identity
with the same length. It also generates a random, 32-bit, unsigned integer to
use as the <tt>obfuscated_ticket_age</tt>. Likewise, for each inner PSK binder, the
client generates a random string of the same length.</t>
          <t>Per the rules of <xref target="real-ech"/>, the server is not permitted to resume a
connection in the outer handshake. If ECH is rejected and the client-facing
server replies with a "pre_shared_key" extension in its ServerHello, then the
client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="padding">
          <name>Recommended Padding Scheme</name>
          <t>If the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> is encrypted without padding, then the length of
the <tt>ClientHelloOuter.payload</tt> can leak information about <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.
In order to prevent this this, the <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> structure
has a padding field. This section describes a deterministic mechanism for
computing the required amount of padding based on the following
observation: individual extensions can reveal sensitive information through
their length. Thus, each extension in the inner ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> may require
different amounts of padding. This padding may be fully determined by the
client's configuration or may require server input.</t>
          <t>By way of example, clients typically support a small number of application
profiles. For instance, a browser might support HTTP with ALPN values
["http/1.1", "h2"] and WebRTC media with ALPNs ["webrtc", "c-webrtc"]. Clients
SHOULD pad this extension by rounding up to the total size of the longest ALPN
extension across all application profiles. The target padding length of most
ClientHello
<tt>ClientHello</tt> extensions can be computed in this way.</t>
          <t>In contrast, clients do not know the longest SNI value in the client-facing
server's anonymity set without server input. Clients SHOULD use the ECHConfig's <tt>ECHConfig</tt>'s
<tt>maximum_name_length</tt> field as follows, where L is the <tt>maximum_name_length</tt>
value.</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>If the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> contained a "server_name" extension with a name of
length D, add max(0, L - D) bytes of padding.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> did not contain a "server_name" extension (e.g., if
the client is connecting to an IP address), add L + 9 bytes of padding. This
is the length of a "server_name" extension with an L-byte name.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>Finally, the client SHOULD pad the entire message as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Let L be the length of the EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> with all the padding
computed so far.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Let N = 31 - ((L - 1) % 32) and add N bytes of padding.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>This rounds the length of EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> up to a multiple of 32 bytes,
reducing the set of possible lengths across all clients.</t>
          <t>In addition to padding ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, clients and servers will also need to
pad all other handshake messages that have sensitive-length fields. For example,
if a client proposes ALPN values in ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the server-selected value
will be returned in an EncryptedExtension, so that handshake message also needs
to be padded using TLS record layer padding.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="determining-ech-acceptance">
          <name>Determining ECH Acceptance</name>
          <t>As described in <xref target="server-behavior"/>, the server may either accept ECH and use
ClientHelloInner
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> or reject it and use ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. This is determined by
the server's initial message.</t>
          <t>If the message does not negotiate TLS 1.3 or higher, the server has rejected
ECH. Otherwise, it is either a ServerHello or HelloRetryRequest.</t>
          <t>If the message is a ServerHello, the client computes <tt>accept_confirmation</tt> as
described in <xref target="backend-server"/>. If this value matches the last 8 bytes of
<tt>ServerHello.random</tt>, the server has accepted ECH. Otherwise, it has rejected
ECH.</t>
          <t>If the message is a HelloRetryRequest, the client checks for the
"encrypted_client_hello" extension. If none is found, the server has rejected
ECH. Otherwise, if it has a length other than 8, the client aborts the handshake
with a "decode_error" alert. Otherwise, the client computes
<tt>hrr_accept_confirmation</tt> as described in <xref target="backend-server-hrr"/>. If this value
matches the extension payload, the server has accepted ECH. Otherwise, it has
rejected ECH.</t>
          <t>If the server accepts ECH, the client handshakes with ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> as
described in <xref target="accepted-ech"/>. Otherwise, the client handshakes with
ClientHelloOuter
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t>
          <!-- [rfced] In the following sentence, does "length other than 8" refer to
bytes? If yes, may we update as follows?

Current:
Otherwise, if it has a length other than 8, the client aborts the
handshake with a "decode_error" alert.

Perhaps:
Otherwise, if it has a length other than 8 bytes, the client aborts
the handshake with a "decode_error" alert.  -->

</section>
        <section anchor="accepted-ech">
          <name>Handshaking with ClientHelloInner</name>
          <t>If the server accepts ECH, the client proceeds with the connection as in
<xref target="RFC8446"/>, with the following modifications:</t>
          <t>The client behaves as if it had sent ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> as the ClientHello. <tt>ClientHello</tt>. That
is, it evaluates the handshake using the ClientHelloInner's <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>'s preferences, and,
when computing the transcript hash (<xref section="4.4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>), it uses
ClientHelloInner
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> as the first ClientHello.</t> <tt>ClientHello</tt>.</t>
          <t>If the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest, the client computes the updated
ClientHello
<tt>ClientHello</tt> message as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>It computes a second ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> based on the first ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, as
in <xref section="4.1.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>. The ClientHelloInner's <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>'s
"encrypted_client_hello" extension is left unmodified.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>It constructs EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>It constructs a second partial ClientHelloOuterAAD <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> message. This message MUST
be syntactically valid. The extensions MAY be copied from the original
ClientHelloOuter unmodified,
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> unmodified or omitted. If not sensitive, the client MAY
copy updated extensions from the second ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> for compression.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>It encrypts EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> as described in
<xref target="encrypting-clienthello"/>, using the second partial ClientHelloOuterAAD, <tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt>, to
obtain a second ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It reuses the original HPKE encryption
context computed in <xref target="real-ech"/> and uses the empty string for <tt>enc</tt>.  </t>
              <t>
The HPKE context maintains a sequence number, so this operation internally
uses a fresh nonce for each AEAD operation. Reusing the HPKE context avoids
an attack described in <xref target="flow-hrr-hijack"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The client then sends the second ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to the server. However, as
above, it uses the second ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> for preferences, and both the
ClientHelloInner
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> messages for the transcript hash. Additionally, it checks the
resulting ServerHello for ECH acceptance as in <xref target="determining-ech-acceptance"/>.
If the ServerHello does not also indicate ECH acceptance, the client MUST
terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="rejected-ech">
          <name>Handshaking with ClientHelloOuter</name>
          <t>If the server rejects ECH, the client proceeds with the handshake,
authenticating for ECHConfig.contents.public_name <tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt> as described in
<xref target="auth-public-name"/>. If authentication or the handshake fails, the client MUST
return a failure to the calling application. It MUST NOT use the retry
configurations. It MUST NOT treat this as a secure signal to
disable ECH.</t>
          <t>If the server supplied an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its
EncryptedExtensions message, the client MUST check that it is syntactically
valid and the client MUST abort the connection with a "decode_error" alert
otherwise. If an earlier TLS version was negotiated, the client MUST NOT enable
the False Start optimization <xref target="RFC7918"/> for this handshake. If both
authentication and the handshake complete successfully, the client MUST perform
the processing described below and then abort the connection with an "ech_required"
alert before sending any application data to the server.</t>
          <t>If the server provided "retry_configs" and if at least one of the
values contains a version supported by the client, the client can
regard the ECH configuration as securely replaced by the server. It
SHOULD retry the handshake with a new transport connection, connection using the
retry configurations supplied by the server.</t>
          <t>Clients can implement a new transport connection in a way that best
suits their deployment. For example, clients can reuse the same server
IP address when establishing the new transport connection or they can
choose to use a different IP address if provided with options from
DNS. ECH does not mandate any specific implementation choices when
establishing this new connection.</t>
          <t>The retry configurations are meant to be used for retried connections. Further
use of retry configurations could yield a tracking vector. In settings where
the client will otherwise already let the server track the client, e.g.,
because the client will send cookies to the server in parallel connections,
using the retry configurations for these parallel connections does not
introduce a new tracking vector.</t>
          <t>If none of the values provided in "retry_configs" contains a supported
version, the server did not supply an "encrypted_client_hello"
extension in its EncryptedExtensions message, or an earlier TLS
version was negotiated, the client can regard ECH as securely disabled
by the server, and it SHOULD retry the handshake with a new transport
connection and ECH disabled.</t>
          <t>Clients SHOULD NOT accept "retry_config" in response to a connection
initiated in response to a "retry_config".  Sending a "retry_config"
in this situation is a signal that the server is misconfigured, e.g.,
the server might have multiple inconsistent configurations so that the
client reached a node with configuration A in the first connection and
a node with configuration B in the second. Note that this guidance
does not apply to the cases in the previous paragraph where the server
has securely disabled ECH.</t>
          <t>If a client does not retry, it MUST report an error to the calling
application.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="auth-public-name">
          <name>Authenticating for the Public Name</name>
          <t>When the server rejects ECH, it continues with the handshake using the plaintext
"server_name" extension instead (see <xref target="server-behavior"/>). Clients that offer
ECH then authenticate the connection with the public name, name as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>The client MUST verify that the certificate is valid for
ECHConfig.contents.public_name.
<tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt>. If invalid, it MUST abort the connection with
the appropriate alert.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If the server requests a client certificate, the client MUST respond with an
empty Certificate message, denoting no client certificate.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>In verifying the client-facing server certificate, the client MUST
interpret the public name as a DNS-based reference identity
<xref target="RFC6125"/>. target="RFC9525"/>. Clients that incorporate DNS names and IP addresses into
the same syntax (e.g. <xref section="7.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3986"/> and <xref target="WHATWG-IPV4"/>)
MUST reject names that would be interpreted as IPv4 addresses.
Clients that enforce this by checking ECHConfig.contents.public_name <tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt>
do not need to repeat the check when processing ECH rejection.</t>
          <t>Note that authenticating a connection for the public name does not authenticate
it for the origin. The TLS implementation MUST NOT report such connections as
successful to the application. It additionally MUST ignore all session tickets
and session IDs presented by the server. These connections are only used to
trigger retries, as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>. This may be implemented, for
instance, by reporting a failed connection with a dedicated error code.</t>
          <t>Prior to attempting a connection, a client SHOULD validate the <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.
Clients SHOULD ignore any
<tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure with a public_name that is not a valid host name in
preferred name syntax (see <xref section="2" sectionFormat="of" target="DNS-TERMS"/>). target="RFC9499"/>).  That is, to be
valid, the public_name needs to be a dot-separated sequence of LDH labels, as
defined in <xref section="2.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5890"/>, where:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>the sequence does not begin or end with an ASCII dot, and</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>all labels are at most 63 octets.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Clients additionally SHOULD ignore the structure if the final LDH
label either consists of all ASCII digits (i.e. (i.e., '0' through '9') or is
"0x" or "0X" followed by some, possibly empty, sequence of ASCII
hexadecimal digits (i.e. (i.e., '0' through '9', 'a' through 'f', and 'A'
through 'F'). This avoids public_name values that may be interpreted
as IPv4 literals.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="impact-of-retry-on-future-connections">
          <name>Impact of Retry on Future Connections</name>
          <t>Clients MAY use information learned from a rejected ECH for future
connections to avoid repeatedly connecting to the same server and
being forced to retry. However, they MUST handle ECH rejection for
those connections as if it were a fresh connection, rather than
enforcing the single retry limit from <xref target="rejected-ech"/>. The reason
for this requirement is that if the server sends a "retry_config"
and then immediately rejects the resulting connection, it is
most likely misconfigured. However, if the server sends a "retry_config"
and then the client tries to use that to connect some time
later, it is possible that the server has changed
its configuration again and is now trying to recover.</t>
          <t>Any persisted information MUST be associated with the ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> source
used to bootstrap the connection, such as a DNS SVCB ServiceMode record
<xref target="ECH-IN-DNS"/>. target="RFCYYY1"/>. Clients MUST limit any sharing of persisted ECH-related
state to connections that use the same ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> source. Otherwise, it
might become possible for the client to have the wrong public name for
the server, making recovery impossible.</t>
          <t>ECHConfigs learned from ECH rejection can be used as a tracking
vector. Clients SHOULD impose the same lifetime and scope restrictions
that they apply to other server-based
tracking vectors such as PSKs.</t>
          <t>In general, the safest way for clients to minimize ECH retries is to
comply with any freshness rules (e.g., DNS TTLs) imposed by the ECH
configuration.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="grease-ech">
        <name>GREASE ECH</name>
        <t>The GREASE ECH mechanism allows a connection between and an ECH-capable client
and a non-ECH server to appear to use ECH, thus reducing the extent to
which ECH connections stick out (see <xref target="dont-stick-out"/>).</t>
        <section anchor="client-greasing">
          <name>Client Greasing</name>
          <t>If the client attempts to connect to a server and does not have an ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt>
structure available for the server, it SHOULD send a GREASE <xref target="RFC8701"/>
"encrypted_client_hello" extension in the first ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Set the <tt>config_id</tt> field to a random byte.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Set the <tt>cipher_suite</tt> field to a supported HpkeSymmetricCipherSuite. The
selection SHOULD vary to exercise all supported configurations, but MAY be
held constant for successive connections to the same server in the same
session.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Set the <tt>enc</tt> field to a randomly-generated randomly generated valid encapsulated public key
output by the HPKE KEM.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Set the <tt>payload</tt> field to a randomly-generated randomly generated string of L+C bytes, where C
is the ciphertext expansion of the selected AEAD scheme and L is the size of
the EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> the client would compute when offering ECH, padded
according to <xref target="padding"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>If sending a second ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> in response to a HelloRetryRequest, the
client copies the entire "encrypted_client_hello" extension from the first
ClientHello.
<tt>ClientHello</tt>. The identical value will reveal to an observer that the value of
"encrypted_client_hello" was fake, but this only occurs if there is a
HelloRetryRequest.</t>
          <t>If the server sends an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in either
HelloRetryRequest or EncryptedExtensions, the client MUST check the extension
syntactically and abort the connection with a "decode_error" alert if it is
invalid. It otherwise ignores the extension. It MUST NOT save the
"retry_configs" value in EncryptedExtensions.</t>
          <t>Offering a GREASE extension is not considered offering an encrypted ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt>
for purposes of requirements in <xref target="real-ech"/>. In particular, the client
MAY offer to resume sessions established without ECH.</t>
          <!-- [rfced] It seems that "client" was intended to be "clients" (plural) in
the sentence below and updated as follows. Please let us know if that is not
accurate.

Original:
Correctly-implemented client will ignore those extensions.

Current:
Correctly implemented clients will ignore those extensions.
-->

</section>
        <section anchor="server-greasing">
          <name>Server Greasing</name>
          <t><xref target="config-extensions-iana"/> describes a set of Reserved extensions
which will never be registered. These can be used by servers to
"grease" the contents of the ECH configuration, as inspired by
<xref target="RFC8701"/>. This helps ensure clients process ECH extensions
correctly. When constructing ECH configurations, servers SHOULD
randomly select from reserved values with the high-order bit
clear. Correctly-implemented client Correctly implemented clients will ignore those extensions.</t>
          <t>The reserved values with the high-order bit set are mandatory, as
defined in <xref target="config-extensions"/>. Servers SHOULD randomly select from
these values and include them in extraneous ECH configurations.
Correctly-implemented
Correctly implemented clients will ignore these configurations because
they do not recognize the mandatory extension.  Servers SHOULD ensure
that any client using these configurations encounters a warning or error
message.  This can be accomplished in several ways, including:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>By giving the extraneous configurations distinctive config IDs or
public names, and rejecting the TLS connection or inserting an
application-level warning message when these are observed.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>By giving the extraneous configurations an invalid public
key and a public name not associated with the server, server so that
the initial ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> will not be decryptable and
the server cannot perform the recovery flow described
in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="server-behavior">
      <name>Server Behavior</name>
      <t>As described in <xref target="topologies"/>, servers can play two roles, either as
the client-facing server or as the back-end backend server.
Depending on the server role, the <tt>ECHClientHello</tt> will be different:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>A client-facing server expects a an <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>outer</tt>, and
proceeds as described in <xref target="client-facing-server"/> to extract a
ClientHelloInner,
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, if available.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A backend server expects a an <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>inner</tt>, and
proceeds as described in <xref target="backend-server"/>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>In split mode, a client-facing server which receives a <tt>ClientHello</tt>
with <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>inner</tt> MUST abort with an
"illegal_parameter" alert. Similarly, in split mode, a backend server
which receives a <tt>ClientHello</tt> with <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>outer</tt>
MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
      <t>In shared mode, a server plays both roles, first decrypting the
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> and then using the contents of the
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.  A shared mode server which receives a
<tt>ClientHello</tt> with <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> of <tt>inner</tt> MUST abort with an
"illegal_parameter" alert, because such a <tt>ClientHello</tt> should never
be received directly from the network.</t>
      <t>If <tt>ECHClientHello.type</tt> is not a valid <tt>ECHClientHelloType</tt>, then
the server MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
      <t>If the "encrypted_client_hello" is not present, then the server completes the
handshake normally, as described in <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="client-facing-server">
        <name>Client-Facing Server</name>
        <t>Upon receiving an "encrypted_client_hello" extension in an initial
ClientHello,
<tt>ClientHello</tt>, the client-facing server determines if it will accept ECH, ECH prior
to negotiating any other TLS parameters. Note that successfully decrypting the
extension will result in a new ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> to process, so even the client's TLS
version preferences may have changed.</t>
        <t>First, the server collects a set of candidate ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values. This list is
determined by one of the two following methods:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Compare ECHClientHello.config_id <tt>ECHClientHello.config_id</tt> against identifiers of each known ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt>
and select the ones that match, if any, as candidates.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Collect all known ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values as candidates, with trial decryption
below determining the final selection.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Some uses of ECH, such as local discovery mode, may randomize the
ECHClientHello.config_id
<tt>ECHClientHello.config_id</tt> since it can be used as a tracking vector. In such
cases, the second method SHOULD be used for matching the ECHClientHello <tt>ECHClientHello</tt> to a
known ECHConfig. <tt>ECHConfig</tt>. See <xref target="ignored-configs"/>. Unless specified by the application
profile or otherwise externally configured, implementations MUST use the first
method.</t>
        <t>The server then iterates over the candidate ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values, attempting to
decrypt the "encrypted_client_hello" extension as follows.</t>
        <t>The server verifies that the ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> supports the cipher suite indicated by
the ECHClientHello.cipher_suite <tt>ECHClientHello.cipher_suite</tt> and that the version of ECH indicated by the
client matches the ECHConfig.version. <tt>ECHConfig.version</tt>. If not, the server continues to the next
candidate ECHConfig.</t> <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.</t>
        <t>Next, the server decrypts ECHClientHello.payload, <tt>ECHClientHello.payload</tt>, using the private key skR
corresponding to ECHConfig, <tt>ECHConfig</tt>, as follows:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
    context = SetupBaseR(ECHClientHello.enc, skR,
                         "tls ech" || 0x00 || ECHConfig)
    EncodedClientHelloInner = context.Open(ClientHelloOuterAAD,
                                           ECHClientHello.payload)
]]></artwork>
        <t>ClientHelloOuterAAD
        <t><tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> is computed from ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as described in
<xref target="authenticating-outer"/>. The <tt>info</tt> parameter to SetupBaseR is the
concatenation "tls ech", a zero byte, and the serialized ECHConfig. <tt>ECHConfig</tt>. If
decryption fails, the server continues to the next candidate ECHConfig. <tt>ECHConfig</tt>.
Otherwise, the server reconstructs ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> from
EncodedClientHelloInner,
<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>, as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>. It then stops
iterating over the candidate ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values.</t>
        <t>Once the server has chosen the correct ECHConfig, <tt>ECHConfig</tt>, it MAY verify that the value
in the ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> "server_name" extension matches the value of
ECHConfig.contents.public_name,
<tt>ECHConfig.contents.public_name</tt> and abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert if
these do not match. This optional check allows the server to limit ECH
connections to only use the public SNI values advertised in its ECHConfigs.
The server MUST be careful not to unnecessarily reject connections if the same
ECHConfig
<tt>ECHConfig</tt> id or keypair is used in multiple ECHConfigs with distinct public
names.</t>
        <t>Upon determining the ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the client-facing server checks that the
message includes a well-formed "encrypted_client_hello" extension of type
<tt>inner</tt> and that it does not offer TLS 1.2 or below. If either of these checks
fails, the client-facing server MUST abort with an "illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
        <t>If these checks succeed, the client-facing server then forwards the
ClientHelloInner
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> to the appropriate backend server, which proceeds as in
<xref target="backend-server"/>. If the backend server responds with a HelloRetryRequest, the
client-facing server forwards it, decrypts the client's second ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
using the procedure in <xref target="client-facing-server-hrr"/>, and forwards the resulting
second ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. The client-facing server forwards all other TLS
messages between the client and backend server unmodified.</t>
        <t>Otherwise, if all candidate ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values fail to decrypt the extension, the
client-facing server MUST ignore the extension and proceed with the connection
using ClientHelloOuter, <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> with the following modifications:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>If sending a HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY include an
"encrypted_client_hello" extension with a payload of 8 random bytes; see
<xref target="dont-stick-out"/> for details.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If the server is configured with any ECHConfigs, it MUST include the
"encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions with the
"retry_configs" field set to one or more ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures with up-to-date
keys. Servers MAY supply multiple ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values of different versions.
This allows a server to support multiple versions at once.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Note that decryption failure could indicate a GREASE ECH extension (see
<xref target="grease-ech"/>), so it is necessary for servers to proceed with the connection
and rely on the client to abort if ECH was required. In particular, the
unrecognized value alone does not indicate a misconfigured ECH advertisement
(<xref target="misconfiguration"/>). Instead, servers can measure occurrences of the
"ech_required" alert to detect this case.</t>
        <section anchor="client-facing-server-hrr">
          <name>Sending HelloRetryRequest</name>
          <t>After sending or forwarding a HelloRetryRequest, the client-facing server does
not repeat the steps in <xref target="client-facing-server"/> with the second
ClientHelloOuter.
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. Instead, it continues with the ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> selection from the
first ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> as follows:</t>
          <t>If the client-facing server accepted ECH, it checks that the second ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
also contains the "encrypted_client_hello" extension. If not, it MUST abort the
handshake with a "missing_extension" alert. Otherwise, it checks that
ECHClientHello.cipher_suite
<tt>ECHClientHello.cipher_suite</tt> and ECHClientHello.config_id <tt>ECHClientHello.config_id</tt> are unchanged, and that
ECHClientHello.enc
<tt>ECHClientHello.enc</tt> is empty. If not, it MUST abort the handshake with an
"illegal_parameter" alert.</t>
          <t>Finally, it decrypts the new ECHClientHello.payload <tt>ECHClientHello.payload</tt> as a second message with the
previous HPKE context:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
    EncodedClientHelloInner = context.Open(ClientHelloOuterAAD,
                                           ECHClientHello.payload)
]]></artwork>
          <t>ClientHelloOuterAAD
          <t><tt>ClientHelloOuterAAD</tt> is computed as described in <xref target="authenticating-outer"/>, but
using the second ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. If decryption fails, the client-facing
server MUST abort the handshake with a "decrypt_error" alert. Otherwise, it
reconstructs the second ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> from the new EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt>
as described in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>, using the second ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> for
any referenced extensions.</t>
          <t>The client-facing server then forwards the resulting ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> to the
backend server. It forwards all subsequent TLS messages between the client and
backend server unmodified.</t>
          <t>If the client-facing server rejected ECH, or if the first ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> did not
include an "encrypted_client_hello" extension, the client-facing server
proceeds with the connection as usual. The server does not decrypt the
second ClientHello's ECHClientHello.payload <tt>ClientHello</tt>'s <tt>ECHClientHello.payload</tt> value, if there is one.
Moreover, if the server is configured with any ECHConfigs, it MUST include the
"encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions with the
"retry_configs" field set to one or more ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures with up-to-date
keys, as described in <xref target="client-facing-server"/>.</t>
          <t>Note that a client-facing server that forwards the first ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> cannot
include its own "cookie" extension if the backend server sends a
HelloRetryRequest.  This means that the client-facing server either needs to
maintain state for such a connection or it needs to coordinate with the backend
server to include any information it requires to process the second ClientHello.</t> <tt>ClientHello</tt>.</t>
          <!-- [rfced] May we rephrase the following text for an improved sentence flow?

Original:
The backend server embeds in `ServerHello.random` a string derived from
the inner handshake.

Perhaps:
A string derived from the inner handshake is embedded into
`ServerHello.random` by the backend server.  -->

</section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="backend-server">
        <name>Backend Server</name>
        <t>Upon receipt of an "encrypted_client_hello" extension of type <tt>inner</tt> in a
ClientHello,
<tt>ClientHello</tt>, if the backend server negotiates TLS 1.3 or higher, then it MUST
confirm ECH acceptance to the client by computing its ServerHello as described
here.</t>
        <t>The backend server embeds in ServerHello.random <tt>ServerHello.random</tt> a string derived from the inner
handshake. It begins by computing its ServerHello as usual, except the last 8
bytes of ServerHello.random <tt>ServerHello.random</tt> are set to zero. It then computes the transcript
hash for ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> up to and including the modified ServerHello, as
described in <xref section="4.4.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>. Let transcript_ech_conf denote the
output. Finally, the backend server overwrites the last 8 bytes of the
ServerHello.random
<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> with the following string:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
   accept_confirmation = HKDF-Expand-Label(
      HKDF-Extract(0, ClientHelloInner.random),
      "ech accept confirmation",
      transcript_ech_conf,
      8)
]]></artwork>
        <t>where HKDF-Expand-Label is defined in <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>, "0" indicates a
string of Hash.length bytes set to zero, and Hash is the hash function used to
compute the transcript hash. In DTLS, the modified version of HKDF-Expand-Label
defined in <xref section="5.9" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9147"/> is used instead.</t>
        <t>The backend server MUST NOT perform this operation if it negotiated TLS 1.2 or
below. Note that doing so would overwrite the downgrade signal for TLS 1.3 (see
<xref section="4.1.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>).</t>
        <section anchor="backend-server-hrr">
          <name>Sending HelloRetryRequest</name>
          <t>When the backend server sends HelloRetryRequest in response to the ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>,
it similarly confirms ECH acceptance by adding a confirmation signal to its
HelloRetryRequest. But instead of embedding the signal in the
HelloRetryRequest.random (the value of which is specified by <xref target="RFC8446"/>), it
sends the signal in an extension.</t>
          <t>The backend server begins by computing HelloRetryRequest as usual, except that
it also contains an "encrypted_client_hello" extension with a payload of 8 zero
bytes. It then computes the transcript hash for the first ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>,
denoted ClientHelloInner1, up to and including the modified HelloRetryRequest.
Let transcript_hrr_ech_conf denote the output. Finally, the backend server
overwrites the payload of the "encrypted_client_hello" extension with the
following string:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
   hrr_accept_confirmation = HKDF-Expand-Label(
      HKDF-Extract(0, ClientHelloInner1.random),
      "hrr ech accept confirmation",
      transcript_hrr_ech_conf,
      8)
]]></artwork>
          <t>In the subsequent ServerHello message, the backend server sends the
accept_confirmation
<tt>accept_confirmation</tt> value as described in <xref target="backend-server"/>.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="deployment">
      <name>Deployment Considerations</name>
      <t>The design of ECH as specified in this document necessarily requires changes
to client, client-facing server, and backend server. Coordination between
client-facing and backend server requires care, as deployment mistakes
can lead to compatibility issues. These are discussed in <xref target="compat-issues"/>.</t>
      <t>Beyond coordination difficulties, ECH deployments may also induce challenges
for use cases of information that ECH protects. In particular,
use cases which depend on this unencrypted information may no longer work
as desired. This is elaborated upon in <xref target="no-sni"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="compat-issues">
        <name>Compatibility Issues</name>
        <t>Unlike most TLS extensions, placing the SNI value in an ECH extension is not
interoperable with existing servers, which expect the value in the existing
plaintext extension. Thus Thus, server operators SHOULD ensure servers understand a
given set of ECH keys before advertising them. Additionally, servers SHOULD
retain support for any previously-advertised previously advertised keys for the duration of their
validity.</t>
        <t>However, in more complex deployment scenarios, this may be difficult to fully
guarantee. Thus Thus, this protocol was designed to be robust in case of
inconsistencies between systems that advertise ECH keys and servers, at the cost
of extra round-trips due to a retry. Two specific scenarios are detailed below.</t>
        <section anchor="misconfiguration">
          <name>Misconfiguration and Deployment Concerns</name>
          <t>It is possible for ECH advertisements and servers to become inconsistent. This
may occur, for instance, from DNS misconfiguration, caching issues, or an
incomplete rollout in a multi-server deployment. This may also occur if a server
loses its ECH keys, or if a deployment of ECH must be rolled back on the server.</t>
          <t>The retry mechanism repairs inconsistencies, provided the TLS server
has a certificate for the public name. If server and advertised keys
mismatch, the server will reject ECH and respond with
"retry_configs". If the server does
not understand the "encrypted_client_hello" extension at all, it will ignore it
as required by <xref section="4.1.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/>. Provided the server can present a certificate
valid for the public name, the client can safely retry with updated settings,
as described in <xref target="rejected-ech"/>.</t>
          <t>Unless ECH is disabled as a result of successfully establishing a connection to
the public name, the client MUST NOT fall back to using unencrypted
ClientHellos, as this allows a network attacker to disclose the contents of this
ClientHello,
<tt>ClientHello</tt>, including the SNI. It MAY attempt to use another server from the
DNS results, if one is provided.</t>
          <t>In order to ensure that the retry mechanism works successfully successfully, servers
SHOULD ensure that every endpoint which might receive a TLS connection
is provisioned with an appropriate certificate for the public name.
This is especially important during periods of server reconfiguration
when different endpoints might have different configurations.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="middleboxes">
          <name>Middleboxes</name>
          <!--[rfced] How may we update this sentence to make it clear whether
all the requirements or only some of the requirements require
proxies to act as conforming TLS client and server?

For background, in general, the RPC recommends using nonrestrictive "which"
and restrictive "that". (More details are on
https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/tips/) However, edits to that
usage have not been made in this document. In this specific sentence,
we are asking about the usage because it can affect the understanding
of the statement.

Original:
  The requirements in [RFC8446], Section 9.3 which require proxies to
  act as conforming TLS client and server provide interoperability with
  TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports ECH
  but the proxy does not, as detailed below.

Option A (all requirements require it):
  The requirements in [RFC8446], Section 9.3, which require proxies to
  act as conforming TLS client and server, provide interoperability with
  TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports ECH
  but the proxy does not, as detailed below.

Option B (some requirements require it):
  The requirements in [RFC8446], Section 9.3 that require proxies to
  act as conforming TLS client and server provide interoperability with
  TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports ECH
  but the proxy does not, as detailed below.
-->

<t>The requirements in <xref section="9.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/> which require proxies to
act as conforming TLS client and server provide interoperability
with TLS-terminating proxies even in cases where the server supports
ECH but the proxy does not, as detailed below.</t>
          <t>The proxy must ignore unknown parameters, parameters and
generate its own ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> containing only parameters it understands. Thus,
when presenting a certificate to the client or sending a ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> to the
server, the proxy will act as if connecting to the ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
server_name, which SHOULD match the public name (see <xref target="real-ech"/>), target="real-ech"/>) without
echoing the "encrypted_client_hello" extension.</t>
          <t>Depending on whether the client is configured to accept the proxy's certificate
as authoritative for the public name, this may trigger the retry logic described
in <xref target="rejected-ech"/> or result in a connection failure. A proxy which is not
authoritative for the public name cannot forge a signal to disable ECH.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="no-sni">
        <name>Deployment Impact</name>
        <t>Some use cases which depend on information ECH encrypts may break with the
deployment of ECH. The extent of breakage depends on a number of external
factors, including, for example, whether ECH can be disabled, whether or not
the party disabling ECH is trusted to do so, and whether or not client
implementations will fall back to TLS without ECH in the event of disablement.</t>
        <t>Depending on implementation details and deployment settings, use cases
which depend on plaintext TLS information may require fundamentally different
approaches to continue working. For example, in managed enterprise settings,
one approach may be to disable ECH entirely via group policy and for
client implementations to honor this action. Server deployments which
depend on SNI -- e.g., for load balancing -- may no longer function properly
without updates; the nature of those updates is out of scope of this
specification.</t>
        <t>In the context of <xref target="rejected-ech"/>, another approach may be to
intercept and decrypt client TLS connections. The feasibility of alternative
solutions is specific to individual deployments.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="compliance">
      <name>Compliance Requirements</name>
      <t>In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise,
a compliant ECH application MUST implement the following HPKE cipher suite:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>KEM: DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) (see <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="HPKE"/>)</t> target="RFC9180"/>)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>KDF: HKDF-SHA256 (see <xref section="7.2" sectionFormat="of" target="HPKE"/>)</t> target="RFC9180"/>)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>AEAD: AES-128-GCM (see <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="of" target="HPKE"/>)</t> target="RFC9180"/>)</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This section contains security considerations for ECH.</t>
      <section anchor="goals">
        <name>Security and Privacy Goals</name>
        <t>ECH considers two types of attackers: passive and active. Passive attackers can
read packets from the network, but they cannot perform any sort of active
behavior such as probing servers or querying DNS. A middlebox that filters based
on plaintext packet contents is one example of a passive attacker. In contrast,
active attackers can also write packets into the network for malicious purposes,
such as interfering with existing connections, probing servers, and querying
DNS. In short, an active attacker corresponds to the conventional threat model
<xref target="RFC3552"/> for TLS 1.3 <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
        <t>Passive and active attackers can exist anywhere in the network, including
between the client and client-facing server, as well as between the
client-facing and backend servers when running ECH in Split Mode. split mode. However,
for Split Mode split mode in particular, ECH makes two additional assumptions:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>The channel between each client-facing and each backend server is
authenticated such that the backend server only accepts messages from trusted
client-facing servers. The exact mechanism for establishing this authenticated
channel is out of scope for this document.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The attacker cannot correlate messages between a client and client-facing
server with messages between client-facing and backend server. Such correlation
could allow an attacker to link information unique to a backend server, such as
their server name or IP address, with a client's encrypted ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.
Correlation could occur through timing analysis of messages across the
client-facing server, or via examining the contents of messages sent between
client-facing and backend servers. The exact mechanism for preventing this sort
of correlation is out of scope for this document.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>Given this threat model, the primary goals of ECH are as follows.</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Security preservation. Use of ECH does not weaken the security properties of
TLS without ECH.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Handshake privacy. TLS connection establishment to a server name
within an anonymity set is indistinguishable from a connection to
any other server name within the anonymity set. (The anonymity set
is defined in <xref target="intro"/>.)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Downgrade resistance. An attacker cannot downgrade a connection that
attempts to use ECH to one that does not use ECH.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>These properties were formally proven in <xref target="ECH-Analysis"/>.</t>
        <t>With regards to handshake privacy, client-facing server configuration
determines the size of the anonymity set. For example, if a
client-facing server uses distinct ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values for each server
name, then each anonymity set has size k = 1. Client-facing servers
SHOULD deploy ECH in such a way so as to maximize the size of the
anonymity set where possible. This means client-facing servers should
use the same ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> for as many server names as possible. An
attacker can distinguish two server names that have different
ECHConfig
<tt>ECHConfig</tt> values based on the ECHClientHello.config_id <tt>ECHClientHello</tt>.<tt>config_id</tt> value.</t>
        <t>This also means public information in a TLS handshake should be
consistent across server names. For example, if a client-facing server
services many backend origin server names, only one of which supports some
cipher suite, it may be possible to identify that server name based on the
contents of the unencrypted handshake message. Similarly, if a backend
origin reuses KeyShare values, then that provides a unique identifier
for that server.</t>
        <t>Beyond these primary security and privacy goals, ECH also aims to hide, to some
extent, the fact that it is being used at all. Specifically, the GREASE ECH
extension described in <xref target="grease-ech"/> does not change the security properties of
the TLS handshake at all. Its goal is to provide "cover" for the real ECH
protocol (<xref target="real-ech"/>), as a means of addressing the "do not stick out"
requirements of <xref target="RFC8744"/>. See <xref target="dont-stick-out"/> for details.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="plaintext-dns">
        <name>Unauthenticated and Plaintext DNS</name>
        <t>ECH supports delivery of configurations through the DNS using SVCB or HTTPS
records,
records without requiring any verifiable authenticity or provenance
information <xref target="ECH-IN-DNS"/>. target="RFCYYY1"/>. This means that any attacker which can inject
DNS responses or poison DNS caches, which is a common scenario in
client access networks, can supply clients with fake ECH configurations (so
that the client encrypts data to them) or strip the ECH configurations from
the response. However, in the face of an attacker that controls DNS,
no encryption scheme can work because the attacker can replace the IP
address, thus blocking client connections, or substitute a unique IP
address for each DNS name that was looked up.  Thus, using DNS records
without additional authentication does not make the situation significantly
worse.</t>
        <t>Clearly, DNSSEC (if the client validates and hard fails) is a defense
against this form of attack, but encrypted DNS transport is also a
defense against DNS attacks by attackers on the local network, which
is a common case where ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> and SNI encryption are
desired. Moreover, as noted in the introduction, SNI encryption is
less useful without encryption of DNS queries in transit.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="client-tracking">
        <name>Client Tracking</name>
        <t>A malicious client-facing server could distribute unique, per-client ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt>
structures as a way of tracking clients across subsequent connections. On-path
adversaries which know about these unique keys could also track clients in this
way by observing TLS connection attempts.</t>
        <t>The cost of this type of attack scales linearly with the desired number of
target clients. Moreover, DNS caching behavior makes targeting individual users
for extended periods of time, e.g., using per-client ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structures
delivered via HTTPS RRs with high TTLs, challenging. Clients can help mitigate
this problem by flushing any DNS or ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> state upon changing networks
(this may not be possible if clients use the operating system resolver
rather than doing their own resolution).</t>
        <t>ECHConfig
        <t><tt>ECHConfig</tt> rotation rate is also an issue for non-malicious servers,
which may want to rotate keys frequently to limit exposure if the key
is compromised. Rotating too frequently limits the client anonymity
set. In practice, servers which service many server names and thus
have high loads are the best candidates to be client-facing servers
and so anonymity sets will typically involve many connections even
with fairly fast rotation intervals.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ignored-configs">
        <name>Ignored Configuration Identifiers and Trial Decryption</name>
        <t>Ignoring configuration identifiers may be useful in scenarios where clients and
client-facing servers do not want to reveal information about the client-facing
server in the "encrypted_client_hello" extension. In such settings, clients send
a randomly generated config_id <tt>config_id</tt> in the ECHClientHello. <tt>ECHClientHello</tt>. Servers in these settings
must perform trial decryption since they cannot identify the client's chosen ECH
key using the config_id <tt>config_id</tt> value. As a result, ignoring configuration
identifiers may exacerbate DoS attacks. Specifically, an adversary may send
malicious ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> messages, i.e., those which will not decrypt with any
known ECH key, in order to force wasteful decryption. Servers that support this
feature should, for example, implement some form of rate limiting mechanism to
limit the potential damage caused by such attacks.</t>
        <t>Unless specified by the application using (D)TLS or externally configured,
implementations MUST NOT use this mode.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="outer-clienthello">
        <name>Outer ClientHello</name>
        <t>Any information that the client includes in the ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> is visible to
passive observers. The client SHOULD NOT send values in the ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
which would reveal a sensitive ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> property, such as the true
server name. It MAY send values associated with the public name in the
ClientHelloOuter.</t>
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t>
        <t>In particular, some extensions require the client send a server-name-specific
value in the ClientHello. <tt>ClientHello</tt>. These values may reveal information about the
true server name. For example, the "cached_info" ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> extension
<xref target="RFC7924"/> can contain the hash of a previously observed server certificate.
The client SHOULD NOT send values associated with the true server name in the
ClientHelloOuter.
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. It MAY send such values in the ClientHelloInner.</t> <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t>
        <t>A client may also use different preferences in different contexts. For example,
it may send different ALPN lists to different servers or in different
application contexts. A client that treats this context as sensitive SHOULD NOT
send context-specific values in ClientHelloOuter.</t> <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t>
        <t>Values which are independent of the true server name, or other information the
client wishes to protect, MAY be included in ClientHelloOuter. <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>. If they match
the corresponding ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, they MAY be compressed as described in
<xref target="encoding-inner"/>. However, note that the payload length reveals information
about which extensions are compressed, so inner extensions which only sometimes
match the corresponding outer extension SHOULD NOT be compressed.</t>
        <t>Clients MAY include additional extensions in ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to avoid
signaling unusual behavior to passive observers, provided the choice of value
and value itself are not sensitive. See <xref target="dont-stick-out"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="inner-clienthello">
        <name>Inner ClientHello</name>
        <t>Values which depend on the contents of ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, such as the
true server name, can influence how client-facing servers process this message.
In particular, timing side channels can reveal information about the contents
of ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. Implementations should take such side channels into
consideration when reasoning about the privacy properties that ECH provides.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="related-privacy-leaks">
        <name>Related Privacy Leaks</name>
        <t>ECH requires encrypted DNS to be an effective privacy protection mechanism.
However, verifying the server's identity from the Certificate message,
particularly when using the X509 CertificateType, may result in additional
network traffic that may reveal the server identity. Examples of this traffic
may include requests for revocation information, such as OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or CRL Certificate Revocation List (CRL) traffic, or requests for repository information, such as authorityInformationAccess. It may also include implementation-specific traffic for additional information sources as part of verification.</t>
        <t>Implementations SHOULD avoid leaking information that may identify the server.
Even when sent over an encrypted transport, such requests may result in indirect
exposure of the server's identity, such as indicating a specific CA or service
being used. To mitigate this risk, servers SHOULD deliver such information
in-band when possible, such as through the use of OCSP stapling, and clients
SHOULD take steps to minimize or protect such requests during certificate
validation.</t>
        <t>Attacks that rely on non-ECH traffic to infer server identity in an ECH
connection are out of scope for this document. For example, a client that
connects to a particular host prior to ECH deployment may later resume a
connection to that same host after ECH deployment. An adversary that observes
this can deduce that the ECH-enabled connection was made to a host that the
client previously connected to and which is within the same anonymity set.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cookies">
        <name>Cookies</name>
        <t><xref section="4.2.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8446"/> defines a cookie value that servers may send in
HelloRetryRequest for clients to echo in the second ClientHello. <tt>ClientHello</tt>. While ECH
encrypts the cookie in the second ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, the backend server's
HelloRetryRequest is unencrypted.This unencrypted. This means differences in cookies between
backend servers, such as lengths or cleartext components, may leak information
about the server identity.</t>
        <t>Backend servers in an anonymity set SHOULD NOT reveal information in the cookie
which identifies the server. This may be done by handling HelloRetryRequest
statefully, thus not sending cookies, or by using the same cookie construction
for all backend servers.</t>
        <t>Note that, if the cookie includes a key name, analogous to <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5077"/>, this may leak information if different backend servers issue
cookies with different key names at the time of the connection. In particular,
if the deployment operates in Split Mode, split mode, the backend servers may not share
cookie encryption keys. Backend servers may mitigate this by either by handling
key rotation with trial decryption, decryption or by coordinating to match key names.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="attacks-exploiting-acceptance-confirmation">
        <name>Attacks Exploiting Acceptance Confirmation</name>
        <t>To signal acceptance, the backend server overwrites 8 bytes of its
ServerHello.random
<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> with a value derived from the ClientHelloInner.random. <tt>ClientHelloInner.random</tt>. (See
<xref target="backend-server"/> for details.) This behavior increases the likelihood of the
ServerHello.random
<tt>ServerHello.random</tt> colliding with the ServerHello.random <tt>ServerHello.random</tt> of a previous session,
potentially reducing the overall security of the protocol. However, the
remaining 24 bytes provide enough entropy to ensure this is not a practical
avenue of attack.</t>
        <t>On the other hand, the probability that two 8-byte strings are the same is
non-negligible. This poses a modest operational risk. Suppose the client-facing
server terminates the connection (i.e., ECH is rejected or bypassed): if the
last 8 bytes of its ServerHello.random <tt>ServerHello.random</tt> coincide with the confirmation signal,
then the client will incorrectly presume acceptance and proceed as if the
backend server terminated the connection. However, the probability of a false
positive occurring for a given connection is only 1 in 2^64. This value is
smaller than the probability of network connection failures in practice.</t>
        <t>Note that the same bytes of the ServerHello.random <tt>ServerHello.random</tt> are used to implement
downgrade protection for TLS 1.3 (see <xref section="4.1.3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8446"/>). These
mechanisms do not interfere because the backend server only signals ECH
acceptance in TLS 1.3 or higher.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="comparison-against-criteria">
        <name>Comparison Against Criteria</name>
        <t><xref target="RFC8744"/> lists several requirements for SNI encryption.
In this section, we re-iterate reiterate these requirements and assess the ECH design
against them.</t>
        <section anchor="mitigate-cut-and-paste-attacks">
          <name>Mitigate Cut-and-Paste Attacks</name>
          <t>Since servers process either ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> or ClientHelloOuter, <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>, and because
ClientHelloInner.random
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.random is encrypted, it is not possible for an attacker to "cut
and paste" the ECH value in a different Client Hello and learn information from
ClientHelloInner.</t>
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="avoid-widely-shared-secrets">
          <name>Avoid Widely Shared Secrets</name>
          <t>This design depends upon DNS as a vehicle for semi-static public key
distribution. Server operators may partition their private keys
however they see fit provided each server behind an IP address has the
corresponding private key to decrypt a key. Thus, when one ECH key is
provided, sharing is optimally bound by the number of hosts that share
an IP address. Server operators may further limit sharing of private
keys by publishing different DNS records containing ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> values
with different public keys using a short TTL.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sni-based-denial-of-service-attacks">
          <name>SNI-Based Denial-of-Service Attacks</name>
          <t>This design requires servers to decrypt ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> messages with ECHClientHello <tt>ECHClientHello</tt>
extensions carrying valid digests. Thus, it is possible for an attacker to force
decryption operations on the server. This attack is bound by the number of valid
transport connections an attacker can open.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="dont-stick-out">
          <name>Do Not Stick Out</name>
          <t>As a means of reducing the impact of network ossification, <xref target="RFC8744"/>
recommends SNI-protection mechanisms be designed in such a way that network
operators do not differentiate connections using the mechanism from connections
not using the mechanism. To that end, ECH is designed to resemble a standard
TLS handshake as much as possible. The most obvious difference is the extension
itself: as long as middleboxes ignore it, as required by <xref target="RFC8446"/>, the rest
of the handshake is designed to look very much as usual.</t>
          <t>The GREASE ECH protocol described in <xref target="grease-ech"/> provides a low-risk way to
evaluate the deployability of ECH. It is designed to mimic the real ECH protocol
(<xref target="real-ech"/>) without changing the security properties of the handshake. The
underlying theory is that if GREASE ECH is deployable without triggering
middlebox misbehavior, and real ECH looks enough like GREASE ECH, then ECH
should be deployable as well. Thus, the strategy for mitigating network
ossification is to deploy GREASE ECH widely enough to disincentivize
differential treatment of the real ECH protocol by the network.</t>
          <t>Ensuring that networks do not differentiate between real ECH and GREASE ECH may
not be feasible for all implementations. While most middleboxes will not treat
them differently, some operators may wish to block real ECH usage but allow
GREASE ECH. This specification aims to provide a baseline security level that
most deployments can achieve easily, easily while providing implementations enough
flexibility to achieve stronger security where possible. Minimally, real ECH is
designed to be indifferentiable from GREASE ECH for passive adversaries with
following capabilities:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>The attacker does not know the ECHConfigList <tt>ECHConfigList</tt> used by the server.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The attacker keeps per-connection state only. In particular, it does not
track endpoints across connections.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>Moreover, real ECH and GREASE ECH are designed so that the following features
do not noticeably vary to the attacker, i.e., they are not distinguishers:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>the code points of extensions negotiated in the clear, and their order;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>the length of messages; and</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>the values of plaintext alert messages.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>This leaves a variety of practical differentiators out-of-scope. including,
though not limited to, the following:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>the value of the configuration identifier;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>the value of the outer SNI;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>the TLS version negotiated, which may depend on ECH acceptance;</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>client authentication, which may depend on ECH acceptance; and</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>HRR issuance, which may depend on ECH acceptance.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>These can be addressed with more sophisticated implementations, but some
mitigations require coordination between the client and server, and even
across different client and server implementations. These mitigations are
out-of-scope for this specification.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="maintain-forward-secrecy">
          <name>Maintain Forward Secrecy</name>
          <t>This design does not provide forward secrecy for the inner ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt>
because the server's ECH key is static.  However, the window of
exposure is bound by the key lifetime. It is RECOMMENDED that servers
rotate keys regularly.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="enable-multi-party-security-contexts">
          <name>Enable Multi-party Security Contexts</name>
          <t>This design permits servers operating in Split Mode split mode to forward connections
directly to backend origin servers. The client authenticates the identity of
the backend origin server, thereby allowing the backend origin server
to hide behind the client-facing server without the client-facing
server decrypting and reencrypting the connection.</t>
          <t>Conversely, if the DNS records used for configuration are
authenticated, e.g., via DNSSEC,
spoofing a client-facing server operating in Split Mode split mode is not
possible. See <xref target="plaintext-dns"/> for more details regarding plaintext
DNS.</t>
          <t>Authenticating the ECHConfig <tt>ECHConfig</tt> structure naturally authenticates the included
public name. This also authenticates any retry signals from the client-facing
server because the client validates the server certificate against the public
name before retrying.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="support-multiple-protocols">
          <name>Support Multiple Protocols</name>
          <t>This design has no impact on application layer protocol negotiation. It may
affect connection routing, server certificate selection, and client certificate
verification. Thus, it is compatible with multiple application and transport
protocols. By encrypting the entire ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>, this design additionally
supports encrypting the ALPN extension.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="padding-policy">
        <name>Padding Policy</name>
        <t>Variations in the length of the ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> ciphertext could leak
information about the corresponding plaintext. <xref target="padding"/> describes a
RECOMMENDED padding mechanism for clients aimed at reducing potential
information leakage.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="active-attack-mitigations">
        <name>Active Attack Mitigations</name>
        <t>This section describes the rationale for ECH properties and mechanics as
defenses against active attacks. In all the attacks below, the attacker is
on-path between the target client and server. The goal of the attacker is to
learn private information about the inner ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>, such as the true SNI
value.</t>
        <section anchor="flow-client-reaction">
          <name>Client Reaction Attack Mitigation</name>
          <t>This attack uses the client's reaction to an incorrect certificate as an oracle.
The attacker intercepts a legitimate ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> and replies with a ServerHello,
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finished messages, wherein the Certificate
message contains a "test" certificate for the domain name it wishes to query. If
the client decrypted the Certificate and failed verification (or leaked
information about its verification process by a timing side channel), the
attacker learns that its test certificate name was incorrect. As an example,
suppose the client's SNI value in its inner ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> is "example.com," and
the attacker replied with a Certificate for "test.com". If the client produces a
verification failure alert because of the mismatch faster than it would due to
the Certificate signature validation, information about the name leaks. Note
that the attacker can also withhold the CertificateVerify message. In that
scenario, a client which first verifies the Certificate would then respond
similarly and leak the same information.</t>
          <figure anchor="flow-diagram-client-reaction">
            <name>Client reaction attack</name> Reaction Attack</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
 Client                         Attacker               Server
   ClientHello
   + key_share
   + ech         ------>      (intercept)     -----> X (drop)

                             ServerHello
                             + key_share
                   {EncryptedExtensions}
                   {CertificateRequest*}
                          {Certificate*}
                    {CertificateVerify*}
                 <------
   Alert
                 ------>
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t>ClientHelloInner.random
          <t><tt>ClientHelloInner.random</tt> prevents this attack. In particular, since the attacker
does not have access to this value, it cannot produce the right transcript and
handshake keys needed for encrypting the Certificate message. Thus, the client
will fail to decrypt the Certificate and abort the connection.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="flow-hrr-hijack">
          <name>HelloRetryRequest Hijack Mitigation</name>
          <t>This attack aims to exploit server HRR state management to recover information
about a legitimate ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> using its own attacker-controlled ClientHello. <tt>ClientHello</tt>.
To begin, the attacker intercepts and forwards a legitimate ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> with an
"encrypted_client_hello" (ech) extension to the server, which triggers a
legitimate HelloRetryRequest in return. Rather than forward the retry to the
client, the attacker attempts to generate its own ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> in response based
on the contents of the first ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> and HelloRetryRequest exchange with the
result that the server encrypts the Certificate to the attacker. If the server
used the SNI from the first ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> and the key share from the second
(attacker-controlled) ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>, the Certificate produced would leak the
client's chosen SNI to the attacker.</t>
          <figure anchor="flow-diagram-hrr-hijack">
            <name>HelloRetryRequest hijack attack</name> Hijack Attack</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
 Client                         Attacker                   Server
   ClientHello
   + key_share
   + ech         ------>       (forward)        ------->
                                              HelloRetryRequest
                                                    + key_share
                              (intercept)       <-------

                              ClientHello
                              + key_share'
                              + ech'           ------->
                                                    ServerHello
                                                    + key_share
                                          {EncryptedExtensions}
                                          {CertificateRequest*}
                                                 {Certificate*}
                                           {CertificateVerify*}
                                                     {Finished}
                                                <-------
                         (process server flight)
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t>This attack is mitigated by using the same HPKE context for both ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt>
messages. The attacker does not possess the context's keys, so it cannot
generate a valid encryption of the second inner ClientHello.</t> <tt>ClientHello</tt>.</t>
          <t>If the attacker could manipulate the second ClientHello, <tt>ClientHello</tt>, it might be possible
for the server to act as an oracle if it required parameters from the first
ClientHello
<tt>ClientHello</tt> to match that of the second ClientHello. <tt>ClientHello</tt>. For example, imagine the
client's original SNI value in the inner ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> is "example.com", and the
attacker's hijacked SNI value in its inner ClientHello <tt>ClientHello</tt> is "test.com". A server
which checks these for equality and changes behavior based on the result can be
used as an oracle to learn the client's SNI.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="flow-clienthello-malleability">
          <name>ClientHello Malleability Mitigation</name>
          <t>This attack aims to leak information about secret parts of the encrypted
ClientHello
<tt>ClientHello</tt> by adding attacker-controlled parameters and observing the server's
response. In particular, the compression mechanism described in
<xref target="encoding-inner"/> references parts of a potentially attacker-controlled
ClientHelloOuter
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to construct ClientHelloInner, <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>, or a buggy server may
incorrectly apply parameters from ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> to the handshake.</t>
          <t>To begin, the attacker first interacts with a server to obtain a resumption
ticket for a given test domain, such as "example.com". Later, upon receipt of a
ClientHelloOuter,
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>, it modifies it such that the server will process the
resumption ticket with ClientHelloInner. <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. If the server only accepts resumption
PSKs that match the server name, it will fail the PSK binder check with an
alert when ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> is for "example.com" but silently ignore the PSK
and continue when ClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> is for any other name. This introduces an
oracle for testing encrypted SNI values.</t>
          <figure anchor="tls-clienthello-malleability">
            <name>Message flow Flow for malleable Malleable ClientHello</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
      Client              Attacker                       Server

                                    handshake and ticket
                                       for "example.com"
                                       <-------->

      ClientHello
      + key_share
      + ech
         + ech_outer_extensions(pre_shared_key)
      + pre_shared_key
                  -------->
                        (intercept)
                        ClientHello
                        + key_share
                        + ech
                           + ech_outer_extensions(pre_shared_key)
                        + pre_shared_key'
                                          -------->
                                                         Alert
                                                         -or-
                                                   ServerHello
                                                            ...
                                                      Finished
                                          <--------
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t>This attack may be generalized to any parameter which the server varies by
server name, such as ALPN preferences.</t>
          <t>ECH mitigates this attack by only negotiating TLS parameters from
ClientHelloInner
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> and authenticating all inputs to the ClientHelloInner
(EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>
(<tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> and ClientHelloOuter) <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>) with the HPKE AEAD. See
<xref target="authenticating-outer"/>. The decompression process in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>
forbids "encrypted_client_hello" in OuterExtensions. This ensures the
unauthenticated portion of ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> is not incorporated into
ClientHelloInner.
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt>. An earlier iteration of this specification only
encrypted and authenticated the "server_name" extension, which left the overall
ClientHello
<tt>ClientHello</tt> vulnerable to an analogue of this attack.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="decompression-amp">
          <name>ClientHelloInner Packet Amplification Mitigation</name>
          <t>Client-facing servers must decompress EncodedClientHelloInners. A malicious
attacker may craft a packet which takes excessive resources to decompress
or may be much larger than the incoming packet:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>If looking up a ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> extension takes time linear in the number of
extensions, the overall decoding process would take O(M*N) time, where
M is the number of extensions in ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> and N is the
size of OuterExtensions.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If the same ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> extension can be copied multiple times,
an attacker could cause the client-facing server to construct a large
ClientHelloInner
<tt>ClientHelloInner</tt> by including a large extension in ClientHelloOuter, <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>
of length L, L and an OuterExtensions list referencing N copies of that
extension. The client-facing server would then use O(N*L) memory in
response to O(N+L) bandwidth from the client. In split-mode, split mode, an
O(N*L) sized
O(N*L)-sized packet would then be transmitted to the
backend server.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>ECH mitigates this attack by requiring that OuterExtensions be referenced in
order, that duplicate references be rejected, and by recommending that
client-facing servers use a linear scan to perform decompression. These
requirements are detailed in <xref target="encoding-inner"/>.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="update-of-the-tls-extensiontype-registry">
        <name>Update of the TLS ExtensionType Registry</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create has created the following entries in the existing registry for
"TLS ExtensionType Values" registry (defined in <xref target="RFC8446"/>):</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>encrypted_client_hello(0xfe0d),
            <t>encrypted_client_hello (0xfe0d), with "TLS 1.3" column values set to
"CH, HRR, EE", "DTLS-Only" column set to "N", and "Recommended" column set
to "Yes".</t> "Y".</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>ech_outer_extensions(0xfd00),
            <t>ech_outer_extensions (0xfd00), with the "TLS 1.3" column values set to "CH",
"DTLS-Only" column set to "N", "Recommended" column set to "Yes", "Y", and the
"Comment" column set to "Only appears in inner CH."</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
      </section>
      <section anchor="alerts">
        <name>Update of the TLS Alert Registry</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create has created an entry, ech_required(121) ech_required (121) in the existing "TLS
Alerts" registry
for Alerts (defined in <xref target="RFC8446"/>), with the "DTLS-OK" column
set to "Y".</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="config-extensions-iana">
        <name>ECH Configuration Extension Registry</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create has created a new "ECHConfig "TLS ECHConfig Extension" registry in a new
"TLS Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) Configuration Extensions" page. registry group. New
registrations need to will list the following attributes:</t>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Value:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The two-byte identifier for the ECHConfigExtension, i.e., the
ECHConfigExtensionType</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Extension Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Name of the ECHConfigExtension</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Recommended:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A "Y" or "N" value indicating if the extension is TLS WG Working Group recommends that the
extension be supported. This column is assigned a value of "N" unless
explicitly requested. Adding a value with a value of "Y" requires Standards
Action <xref target="RFC8126"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The specification where the ECHConfigExtension is defined</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Notes:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Any notes associated with the entry</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>New entries in the "ECHConfig "TLS ECHConfig Extension" registry are subject to the
Specification Required registration policy (<xref section="4.6" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8126"/>), with the policies described in <xref section="17" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8447"/>. IANA
[shall add/has added]
has added the following note to the TLS "TLS ECHConfig Extension Extension"
registry:</t>
        <t>Note:  The role of the designated expert is described in RFC 8447.
      The designated expert <xref target="RFC8126"/> ensures that the specification is
      publicly available.  It is sufficient to have an Internet-Draft
      (that is posted and never published as an RFC) or a document from
      another standards body, industry consortium, university site, etc.
      The expert may provide more in depth in-depth reviews, but their approval
      should not be taken as an endorsement of the extension.</t>
        <t>This document defines several Reserved values for ECH configuration extensions
to be used for "greasing" as described in <xref target="server-greasing"/>.</t>
        <t>The initial contents for this registry consists of multiple reserved values, values
with the following attributes, which are repeated for each registration:</t>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Value:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>0x0000, 0x1A1A, 0x2A2A, 0x3A3A, 0x4A4A, 0x5A5A, 0x6A6A, 0x7A7A, 0x8A8A,
0x9A9A, 0xAAAA, 0xBABA, 0xCACA, 0xDADA, 0xEAEA, 0xFAFA</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Extension Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>RESERVED</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Recommended:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Y</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>This document</t>
            <t>RFC 9849</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Notes:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Grease entries.</t>
            <t>GREASE entries</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <displayreference target="RFC9180" to="HPKE"/>
    <displayreference target="RFC9499" to="DNS-TERMS"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.kazuho-protected-sni" to="PROTECTED-SNI"/>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7918.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9180.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9147.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9460.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9525.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5890.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8447.xml"/>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7918">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start</title>
            <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
            <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/>
            <author fullname="B. Moeller" initials="B." surname="Moeller"/>
            <date month="August" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies an optional behavior of Transport Layer Security (TLS) client implementations, dubbed "False Start". It affects only protocol timing, not on-the-wire protocol data, and can be implemented unilaterally. A TLS False Start reduces handshake latency to one round trip.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7918"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7918"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8446">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9147">
          <front>
            <title>The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <author fullname="N. Modadugu" initials="N." surname="Modadugu"/>
            <date month="April" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 6347.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9147"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9147"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9460">
          <front>
            <title>Service Binding and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS Resource Records)</title>
            <author fullname="B. Schwartz" initials="B." surname="Schwartz"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bishop" initials="M." surname="Bishop"/>
            <author fullname="E. Nygren" initials="E." surname="Nygren"/>
            <date month="November" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the "SVCB" ("Service Binding") and "HTTPS" DNS resource record (RR) types to facilitate the lookup of information needed to make connections to network services, such as for HTTP origins. SVCB records allow a service to be provided from multiple alternative endpoints, each with associated parameters (such as transport protocol configuration), and are extensible to support future uses (such as keys for encrypting the TLS ClientHello). They also enable aliasing of apex domains, which is not possible with CNAME. The HTTPS RR is a variation of SVCB for use with HTTP (see RFC 9110, "HTTP Semantics"). By providing more information to the client before it attempts to establish a connection, these records offer potential benefits to both performance and privacy.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9460"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9460"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ECH-IN-DNS"> anchor="RFCYYY1" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcYYY1">
          <front>
            <title>Bootstrapping TLS Encrypted ClientHello with DNS Service Bindings</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Schwartz" fullname="Benjamin M. Schwartz" initials="B. M." surname="Schwartz">
              <organization>Meta Platforms, Inc.</organization> Schwartz">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mike Bishop" initials="M." surname="Bishop">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization> surname="Bishop" fullname="Mike Bishop">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Erik Nygren" initials="E." surname="Nygren">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization> surname="Nygren" fullname="Erik Nygren">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date day="12" month="February" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   To use TLS Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) the client needs to learn the
   ECH configuration for a server before it attempts a connection to the
   server.  This specification provides a mechanism for conveying the
   ECH configuration information via DNS, using a SVCB or HTTPS record.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="HPKE">
          <front>
            <title>Hybrid Public Key Encryption</title>
            <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
            <author fullname="K. Bhargavan" initials="K." surname="Bhargavan"/>
            <author fullname="B. Lipp" initials="B." surname="Lipp"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wood" initials="C." surname="Wood"/>
            <date month="February" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a scheme for hybrid public key encryption (HPKE). This scheme provides a variant of public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key. It also includes three authenticated variants, including one that authenticates possession of a pre-shared key and two optional ones that authenticate possession of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) private key. HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric KEM, key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) encryption function. Some authenticated variants may not be supported by all KEMs. We provide instantiations of the scheme using widely used and efficient primitives, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, HMAC-based key derivation function (HKDF), and SHA2.</t>
              <t>This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9180"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9180"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6125">
          <front>
            <title>Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/>
            <author fullname="J. Hodges" initials="J." surname="Hodges"/>
            <date month="March" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many application technologies enable secure communication between two entities by means of Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificates in the context of Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document specifies procedures for representing and verifying the identity of application services in such interactions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6125"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6125"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5890">
          <front>
            <title>Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework</title>
            <author fullname="J. Klensin" initials="J." surname="Klensin"/>
            <date month="August" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is one of a collection that, together, describe the protocol and usage context for a revision of Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA), superseding the earlier version. It describes the document collection and provides definitions and other material that are common to the set. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5890"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5890"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8447">
          <front>
            <title>IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS</title>
            <author fullname="J. Salowey" initials="J." surname="Salowey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a number of changes to TLS and DTLS IANA registries that range from adding notes to the registry all the way to changing the registration policy. These changes were mostly motivated by WG review of the TLS- and DTLS-related registries undertaken as part of the TLS 1.3 development process.</t>
              <t>This document updates the following RFCs: 3749, 5077, 4680, 5246, 5705, 5878, 6520, and 7301.</t>
            </abstract> year="2025" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8447"/> value="YYY1"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8447"/> value="10.17487/RFCYYY1"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="WHATWG-IPV4" target="https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#concept-ipv4-parser">
          <front>
            <title>URL Living Standard - IPv4 Parser</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
              <organization>WHATWG</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2021" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>WHATWG Living Standard</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ECH-Analysis" target="https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/vincent.cheval/publis/BCW-ccs22.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>A Symbolic Analysis of Privacy for TLS 1.3 with Encrypted Client Hello</title>
            <author>
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="November"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7301">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension</title>
            <author fullname="S. Friedl" initials="S." surname="Friedl"/>
            <author fullname="A. Popov" initials="A." surname="Popov"/>
            <author fullname="A. Langley" initials="A." surname="Langley"/>
            <author fullname="E. Stephan" initials="E." surname="Stephan"/>
            <date month="July" year="2014"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for application-layer protocol negotiation within the TLS handshake. For instances in which multiple application protocols are supported on the same TCP or UDP port, this extension allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol will be used within the TLS connection.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7301"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7301"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8484">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="P. McManus" initials="P." surname="McManus"/>
            <date month="October" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a protocol for sending DNS queries and getting DNS responses over HTTPS. Each DNS query-response pair is mapped into an HTTP exchange.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8484"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8484"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7858">
          <front>
            <title>Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Z. Hu" initials="Z." surname="Hu"/>
            <author fullname="L. Zhu" initials="L." surname="Zhu"/>
            <author fullname="J. Heidemann" initials="J." surname="Heidemann"/>
            <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/>
            <author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="May" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in RFC 7626. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.</t>
              <t>This document focuses on securing stub-to-recursive traffic, as per the charter of the DPRIVE Working Group. It does not prevent future applications of the protocol to recursive-to-authoritative traffic.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7858"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7858"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8094">
          <front>
            <title>DNS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author fullname="T. Reddy" initials="T." surname="Reddy"/>
            <author fullname="D. Wing" initials="D." surname="Wing"/>
            <author fullname="P. Patil" initials="P." surname="Patil"/>
            <date month="February" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path between the DNS client and its server. These queries and responses can contain privacy-sensitive information, which is valuable to protect.</t>
              <t>This document proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) for DNS, to protect against passive listeners and certain active attacks. As latency is critical for DNS, this proposal also discusses mechanisms to reduce DTLS round trips and reduce the DTLS handshake size. The proposed mechanism runs over port 853.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8094"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8094"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9250">
          <front>
            <title>DNS over Dedicated QUIC Connections</title>
            <author fullname="C. Huitema" initials="C." surname="Huitema"/>
            <author fullname="S. Dickinson" initials="S." surname="Dickinson"/>
            <author fullname="A. Mankin" initials="A." surname="Mankin"/>
            <date month="May" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the use of QUIC to provide transport confidentiality for DNS. The encryption provided by QUIC has similar properties to those provided by TLS, while QUIC transport eliminates the head-of-line blocking issues inherent with TCP and provides more efficient packet-loss recovery than UDP. DNS over QUIC (DoQ) has privacy properties similar to DNS over TLS (DoT) specified in RFC 7858, and latency characteristics similar to classic DNS over UDP. This specification describes the use of DoQ as a general-purpose transport for DNS and includes the use of DoQ for stub to recursive, recursive to authoritative, and zone transfer scenarios.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9250"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9250"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8701">
          <front>
            <title>Applying Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) to TLS Extensibility</title>
            <author fullname="D. Benjamin" initials="D." surname="Benjamin"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes GREASE (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility), a mechanism to prevent extensibility failures in the TLS ecosystem. It reserves a set of TLS protocol values that may be advertised to ensure peers correctly handle unknown values.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8701"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8701"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3986">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DNS-TERMS">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Terminology</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="K. Fujiwara" initials="K." surname="Fujiwara"/>
            <date month="March" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Domain Name System (DNS) is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 2308 by clarifying the definitions of "forwarder" and "QNAME". It obsoletes RFC 8499 by adding multiple terms and clarifications. Comprehensive lists of changed and new definitions can be found in Appendices A and B.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="219"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9499"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9499"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3552">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/> surname="Bhargavan">
              <organization>Inria</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="B. Korver" initials="B." surname="Korver"/>
            <date month="July" year="2003"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>All RFCs are required to have a Security Considerations section. Historically, such sections have been relatively weak. This document provides guidelines to RFC authors on how to write a good Security Considerations section. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="72"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3552"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3552"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8744">
          <front>
            <title>Issues and Requirements for Server Name Identification (SNI) Encryption in TLS</title> initials="V." surname="Cheval">
              <organization>Inria</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="C. Huitema" initials="C." surname="Huitema"/> surname="Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="July" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the general problem of encrypting the Server Name Identification (SNI) TLS parameter. The proposed solutions hide a hidden service behind a fronting service, only disclosing the SNI of the fronting service to external observers. This document lists known attacks against SNI encryption, discusses the current "HTTP co-tenancy" solution, and presents requirements for future TLS-layer solutions.</t>
              <t>In practice, it may well be that no solution can meet every requirement and that practical solutions will have to make some compromises.</t>
            </abstract> year="2022" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8744"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8744"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7924">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cached Information Extension</title>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes often include fairly static information, such as the server certificate and a list of trusted certification authorities (CAs). This information can be of considerable size, particularly if the server certificate is bundled with a complete certificate chain (i.e., the certificates value="10.1145/3548606.3559360"/>
          <refcontent>CCS '22: Proceedings of intermediate CAs up to the root CA).</t>
              <t>This document defines an extension that allows a TLS client to inform a server of cached information, thereby enabling the server to omit already available information.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7924"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7924"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5077">
          <front>
            <title>Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State</title>
            <author fullname="J. Salowey" initials="J." surname="Salowey"/>
            <author fullname="H. Zhou" initials="H." surname="Zhou"/>
            <author fullname="P. Eronen" initials="P." surname="Eronen"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="January" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a mechanism that enables the Transport Layer Security (TLS) server to resume sessions and avoid keeping per-client session state. The TLS server encapsulates the session state into a ticket and forwards it to the client. The client can subsequently resume a session using the obtained ticket. This document obsoletes RFC 4507. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5077"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5077"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.kazuho-protected-sni">
          <front>
            <title>TLS Extensions for Protecting SNI</title>
            <author fullname="Kazuho Oku" initials="K." surname="Oku">
         </author>
            <date day="18" month="July" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This memo introduces TLS extensions 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and a DNS Resource Record Type
   that can be used to protect attackers from obtaining the value of the
   Server Name Indication extension being transmitted over a Transport
   Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3 handshake.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-kazuho-protected-sni-00"/> Communications Security, pp. 365-379</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9499.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.kazuho-protected-sni.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7301.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8484.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7858.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8094.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9250.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8701.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3552.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8744.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7924.xml"/>
        <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5077.xml"/>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 2017?> 2143?>

<section anchor="linear-outer-extensions">
      <name>Linear-time
      <name>Linear-Time Outer Extension Processing</name>
      <t>The following procedure processes the "ech_outer_extensions" extension (see
<xref target="encoding-inner"/>) in linear time, ensuring that each referenced extension
in the ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> is included at most once:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Let I be initialized to zero and N be set to the number of extensions
in ClientHelloOuter.</t> <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>For each extension type, E, in OuterExtensions:  </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>If E is "encrypted_client_hello", abort the connection with an
"illegal_parameter" alert and terminate this procedure.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>While I is less than N and the I-th extension of
ClientHelloOuter
<tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> does not have type E, increment I.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>If I is equal to N, abort the connection with an "illegal_parameter"
alert and terminate this procedure.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Otherwise, the I-th extension of ClientHelloOuter <tt>ClientHelloOuter</tt> has type E. Copy
it to the EncodedClientHelloInner <tt>EncodedClientHelloInner</tt> and increment I.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
      </ol>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>This document draws extensively from ideas in <xref target="I-D.kazuho-protected-sni"/>, but
is a much more limited mechanism because it depends on the DNS for the
protection of the ECH key. Richard Barnes, Christian Huitema, Patrick McManus,
Matthew Prince, Nick Sullivan, Martin Thomson, and David Benjamin <contact fullname="Richard Barnes"/>, <contact fullname="Christian Huitema"/>, <contact fullname="Patrick McManus"/>,
<contact fullname="Matthew Prince"/>, <contact fullname="Nick Sullivan"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Thomson"/>, and <contact fullname="David Benjamin"/> also provided
important ideas and contributions.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="change-log">
      <name>Change Log</name>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t><strong>RFC Editor's Note:</strong> Please remove this section prior to publication of a
final version of this document.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Issue and pull request numbers are listed with a leading octothorp.</t>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-16">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-16</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Keep-alive</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-15">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-15</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Add CCS2022 reference and summary (#539)</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-14">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-14</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Keep-alive</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-13">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-13</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Editorial improvements</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-12">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-12</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Abort on duplicate OuterExtensions (#514)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Improve EncodedClientHelloInner definition (#503)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarify retry configuration usage (#498)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Expand on config_id generation implications (#491)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Server-side acceptance signal extension GREASE (#481)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Refactor overview, client implementation, and middlebox
sections (#480, #478, #475, #508)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Editorial iprovements (#485, #488, #490, #495, #496, #499, #500,
#501, #504, #505, #507, #510, #511)</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-11">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-11</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Move ClientHello padding to the encoding (#443)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Align codepoints (#464)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Relax OuterExtensions checks for alignment with RFC8446 (#467)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarify HRR acceptance and rejection logic (#470)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Editorial improvements (#468, #465, #462, #461)</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-10">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-10</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Make HRR confirmation and ECH acceptance explicit (#422, #423)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Relax computation of the acceptance signal (#420, #449)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Simplify ClientHelloOuterAAD generation (#438, #442)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Allow empty enc in ECHClientHello (#444)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Authenticate ECHClientHello extensions position in ClientHelloOuterAAD (#410)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Allow clients to send a dummy PSK and early_data in ClientHelloOuter when
applicable (#414, #415)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Compress ECHConfigContents (#409)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate ECHConfig.contents.public_name (#413, #456)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Validate ClientHelloInner contents (#411)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Note split-mode challenges for HRR (#418)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Editorial improvements (#428, #432, #439, #445, #458, #455)</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="since-draft-ietf-tls-esni-09">
        <name>Since draft-ietf-tls-esni-09</name>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Finalize HPKE dependency (#390)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Move from client-computed to server-chosen, one-byte config
identifier (#376, #381)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Rename ECHConfigs to ECHConfigList (#391)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarify some security and privacy properties (#385, #383)</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </back>
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