NETCONF Working Group

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         K. Watsen
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 9640                               Watsen Networks
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track                           16 March 2024
Expires: 17                                 September 2024
ISSN: 2070-1721

             YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography
                   draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-34

Abstract

   This document presents a YANG 1.1 (RFC 7950) module defining
   identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic
   applications.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

   This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with
   finalized values at the time

Status of publication. This note summarizes
   all of the substitutions that are needed.  No other RFC Editor
   instructions are specified elsewhere in this Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
   progress.  Please apply the following replacements:

   *  AAAA --> the assigned RFC value for this draft

   Artwork in this

   This document contains placeholder values for the date of
   publication is a product of this draft.  Please apply the following replacement:

   *  2024-03-16 --> Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the publication date consensus of this draft

   The "Relation to other RFCs" section Section 1.1 contains the text
   "one or more YANG modules" and, later, "modules".  This text is
   sourced from a file in a context where it is unknown how many modules
   a draft defines.  The text is not wrong as is, but it may be improved
   by stating more directly how many modules are defined.

   The "Relation to other RFCs" section Section 1.1 contains a self-
   reference to this draft, along with a corresponding reference in the
   Appendix.  Please replace the self-reference in this section with
   "This RFC" (or similar) IETF community.  It has
   received public review and remove the self-reference in the
   "Normative/Informative References" section, whichever it is in.

   Tree-diagrams in this draft may use the '\' line-folding mode defined
   in RFC 8792.  However, nicer-to-the-eye is when the '\\' line-folding
   mode is used.  The AD suggested suggested putting a request here has been approved for publication by the RFC Editor to help convert "ugly" '\' folded examples to use the
   '\\' folding mode.  "Help convert" may be interpreted as, identify
   what looks ugly and ask the authors to make the adjustment.

   The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:

   *  Appendix A.  Change Log

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 September 2024.
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Relation to other Other RFCs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Specification Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.3.  Adherence to the NMDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     1.4.  Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.  The "ietf-crypto-types" Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.2.  Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     2.3.  YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     3.1.  No Support for CRMF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     3.2.  No Support for Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     3.3.  Unconstrained Public Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     3.4.  Unconstrained Private Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     3.5.  Cleartext Passwords and Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     3.6.  Encrypting Passwords and Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     3.7.  Deletion of Cleartext Key Values  . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     3.8.  Considerations for the "ietf-crypto-types" YANG Module  .  51
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     4.1.  The "IETF XML" IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     4.2.  The "YANG YANG Module Names" Names Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     A.1.  I-D to 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     A.2.  00 to 01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     A.3.  01 to 02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     A.4.  02 to 03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
     A.5.  03 to 04  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.6.  04 to 05  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.7.  05 to 06  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.8.  06 to 07  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     A.9.  07 to 08  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     A.10. 08 to 09  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     A.11. 09 to 10  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     A.12. 10 to 11  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.13. 11 to 12  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.14. 12 to 13  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.15. 13 to 14  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     A.16. 14 to 15  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     A.17. 15 to 16  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     A.18. 16 to 17  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     A.19. 17 to 18  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     A.20. 18 to 19  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     A.21. 19 to 20  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.22. 20 to 21  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.23. 21 to 22  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.24. 22 to 23  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.25. 23 to 24  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.26. 24 to 25  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.27. 25 to 26  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.28. 26 to 27  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.29. 27 to 28  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     A.30. 28 to 29  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
     A.31. 29 to 30  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     A.32. 30 to 32  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
     A.33. 32 to 34  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66

1.  Introduction

   This document presents a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module defining
   identities, typedefs, and groupings useful to cryptographic
   applications.

1.1.  Relation to other Other RFCs

   This document presents one or more a YANG modules module [RFC7950] that are is part of a
   collection of RFCs that work together to, ultimately, support the
   configuration of both the clients and servers of both the
   NETCONF Network
   Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols. [RFC8040].

   The dependency relationship between the primary YANG groupings
   defined in the various RFCs is presented in the below diagram.  In
   some cases, a draft document may define secondary groupings that introduce
   dependencies not illustrated in the diagram.  The labels in the
   diagram are a shorthand name names for the defining RFC. RFCs.  The citation
   reference
   references for the shorthand name is names are provided below the diagram.

   Please note that the arrows in the diagram point from referencer to
   referenced.  For example, the "crypto-types" RFC does not have any
   dependencies, whilst the "keystore" RFC depends on the "crypto-types"
   RFC.

                                  crypto-types
                                    ^      ^
                                   /        \
                                  /          \
                         truststore         keystore
                          ^     ^             ^  ^
                          |     +---------+   |  |
                          |               |   |  |
                          |      +------------+  |
   tcp-client-server      |     /         |      |
      ^    ^        ssh-client-server     |      |
      |    |           ^            tls-client-server
      |    |           |              ^     ^        http-client-server
      |    |           |              |     |                 ^
      |    |           |        +-----+     +---------+       |
      |    |           |        |                     |       |
      |    +-----------|--------|--------------+      |       |
      |                |        |              |      |       |
      +-----------+    |        |              |      |       |
                  |    |        |              |      |       |
                  |    |        |              |      |       |
               netconf-client-server       restconf-client-server

   +======================+===========================================+
   |Label

           +========================+==========================+
           | Label in Diagram       | Originating Reference                |
           +========================+==========================+
           | crypto-types           | RFC 9640                 |
   +======================+===========================================+
   |crypto-types
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] truststore             |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |truststore [RFC9641]                | [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |keystore keystore               | [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] [RFC9642]                |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |tcp-client-server
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server] tcp-client-server      |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |ssh-client-server [RFC9643]                | [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |tls-client-server ssh-client-server      | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] [RFC9644]                |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |http-client-server
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           | [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] tls-client-server      | [RFC9645]                |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |netconf-client-server
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           | [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] http-client-server     |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
   |restconf-client-server| [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] [HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER]     |
   +----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           | netconf-client-server  | [NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER]  |
           +------------------------+--------------------------+
           | restconf-client-server | [RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER] |
           +------------------------+--------------------------+

                 Table 1: Label Labels in Diagram to RFC Mapping

1.2.  Specification Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.3.  Adherence to the NMDA

   This document is compliant with the Network Management Datastore
   Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342].  It does not define any protocol protocol-
   accessible nodes that are "config false".

1.4.  Conventions

   Various examples in this document use "BASE64VALUE=" as a placeholder
   value for binary data that has been base64 encoded (per Section 9.8
   of [RFC7950]).  This placeholder value is used because real base64
   encoded
   base64-encoded structures are often many lines long and hence
   distracting to the example being presented.

   Various examples in this document use the XML [W3C.REC-xml-20081126]
   encoding.  Other encodings, such as JSON [RFC8259], could
   alternatively be used.

   Various examples in this document contain long lines that may be
   folded, as described in [RFC8792].

2.  The "ietf-crypto-types" Module

   This section defines a YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] module called "ietf-crypto-
   types".  A high-level overview of the module is provided in
   Section 2.1.  Examples illustrating the module's use are provided in
   Examples (Section 2.2).
   Section 2.2.  The YANG module itself is defined in Section 2.3.

2.1.  Data Model Overview

   This section provides an overview of the "ietf-crypto-types" module
   in terms of its features, identities, typedefs, and groupings.

2.1.1.  Features

   The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
   the "ietf-crypto-types" module:

   Features:
     +-- one-symmetric-key-format
     +-- one-asymmetric-key-format
     +-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format
     +-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format
     +-- cms-enveloped-data-format
     +-- cms-encrypted-data-format
     +-- p10-csr-format
     +-- csr-generation
     +-- certificate-expiration-notification
     +-- cleartext-passwords
     +-- encrypted-passwords
     +-- cleartext-symmetric-keys
     +-- hidden-symmetric-keys
     +-- encrypted-symmetric-keys
     +-- cleartext-private-keys
     +-- hidden-private-keys
     +-- encrypted-private-keys

   The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as
   that in [RFC8340].

2.1.2.  Identities

   The following diagram illustrates the hierarchical relationship
   amongst the "identity" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types"
   module:

   Identities:
     +-- public-key-format
     |  +-- subject-public-key-info-format
     |  +-- ssh-public-key-format
     +-- private-key-format
     |  +-- rsa-private-key-format
     |  +-- ec-private-key-format
     |  +-- one-asymmetric-key-format
     |            {one-asymmetric-key-format}?
     +-- symmetric-key-format
     |  +-- octet-string-key-format
     |  +-- one-symmetric-key-format
     |            {one-symmetric-key-format}?
     +-- encrypted-value-format
     |  +-- symmetrically-encrypted-value-format
     |  |  |      {symmetrically-encrypted-value-format}?
     |  |  +-- cms-encrypted-data-format
     |  |         {cms-encrypted-data-format}?
     |  +-- asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format
     |     |      {asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format}?
     |     +-- cms-enveloped-data-format
     |            {cms-enveloped-data-format}?
     +-- csr-format
           +-- p10-csr-format {p10-csr-format?}

   The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as
   that in [RFC8340].

   Comments:

   *  The diagram shows that there are five base identities.  The first
      three identities are used to indicate the format for the key data,
      while the fourth identity is used to indicate the format for
      encrypted values.  The fifth identity is used to indicate the
      format for a certificate signing request. request (CSR).  The base
      identities are "abstract", in the object oriented programming
      sense, in that they only define a "class" of formats, rather than
      a specific format.

   *  The various terminal identities define specific encoding formats.
      The derived identities defined in this document are sufficient for
      the effort described in Section 1.1 but, 1.1, but by nature of them being
      identities, additional derived identities MAY be defined by future
      efforts.

   *  Identities used to specify uncommon formats are enabled by
      "feature" statements, allowing applications to support them when
      needed.

2.1.3.  Typedefs

   The following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the
   "typedef" statements defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module:

   Typedefs:
     binary
       +-- csr-info
       +-- csr
       +-- x509
       |  +-- trust-anchor-cert-x509
       |  +-- end-entity-cert-x509
       +-- crl
       +-- ocsp-request
       +-- ocsp-response
       +-- cms
          +-- data-content-cms
          +-- signed-data-cms
          |  +-- trust-anchor-cert-cms
          |  +-- end-entity-cert-cms
          +-- enveloped-data-cms
          +-- digested-data-cms
          +-- encrypted-data-cms
          +-- authenticated-data-cms

   The diagram above uses syntax that is similar to but not the same as
   that in [RFC8340].

   Comments:

   *  All the typedefs defined in the "ietf-crypto-types" module extend
      the "binary" type defined in [RFC7950].

   *  Additionally, all the typedefs define a type for encoding an ASN.1
      [ITU.X680.2021] structure using DER [ITU.X690.2021].

   *  The "trust-anchor-*" and "end-entity-*" typedefs are syntactically
      identical to their base typedefs and only distinguish themselves
      by the expected nature of their content.  These typedefs are
      defined to facilitate common modeling needs.

2.1.4.  Groupings

   The "ietf-crypto-types" module defines the following "grouping"
   statements:

   *  encrypted-value-grouping
   *  password-grouping
   *  symmetric-key-grouping
   *  public-key-grouping
   *  private-key-grouping
   *  asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
   *  certificate-expiration-grouping
   *  trust-anchor-cert-grouping
   *  end-entity-cert-grouping
   *  generate-csr-grouping
   *  asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping
   *  asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping

   Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.

2.1.4.1.  The "encrypted-value-grouping" Grouping

   The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "encrypted-
   value-grouping" grouping:

     grouping encrypted-value-grouping:
       +-- encrypted-by
       +-- encrypted-value-format    identityref
       +-- encrypted-value           binary

   Comments:

   *  The "encrypted-by" node is an empty container (difficult to see in
      the diagram) that a consuming module MUST augment key references
      into.  The "ietf-crypto-types" module is unable to populate this
      container as the module only defines groupings.  Section 2.2.1
      presents an example illustrating a consuming module populating the
      "encrypted-by" container.

   *  The "encrypted-value" node is the value, value encrypted by the key
      referenced by the "encrypted-by" node, node and encoded in the format
      appropriate for the kind of key it was encrypted by.

      -  If the value is encrypted by a symmetric key, then the
         encrypted value is encoded using the format associated with the
         "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format" identity.

      -  If the value is encrypted by an asymmetric key, then the
         encrypted value is encoded using the format associated with the
         "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format" identity.

      See Section 2.1.2 for information about the "format" identities.

2.1.4.2.  The "password-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "password-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram does not expand the
   internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping password-grouping:
       +-- (password-type)
          +--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}?
          |  +-- cleartext-password?   string
          +--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}?
             +-- encrypted-password
                +---u encrypted-value-grouping

   Comments:

   *  The "password-grouping" enables the configuration of credentials
      needed to authenticate to a remote system.  The 'ianach:crypt-
      hash' "ianach:crypt-
      hash" typedef from [RFC7317] should be used instead when needing
      to configure a password to authencate authenticate a local account.

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.1.

   *  The "choice" statement enables the password data to be cleartext
      or encrypted, as follows:

      -  The "cleartext-password" node can encode any cleartext value.

      -  The "encrypted-password" node's structure node is an instance of the "encrypted-
         value-grouping" discussed in Section 2.1.4.1.

2.1.4.3.  The "symmetric-key-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram does not expand
   the internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping symmetric-key-grouping:
       +-- key-format?                      identityref
       +-- (key-type)
          +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key)
          |  +-- cleartext-symmetric-key?   binary
          |          {cleartext-symmetric-keys}?
          +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}?
          |  +-- hidden-symmetric-key?      empty
          +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}?
             +-- encrypted-symmetric-key
                +---u encrypted-value-grouping

   Comments:

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.1.

   *  The "key-format" node is an identity-reference to the "symmetric-
      key-format" abstract base identity discussed in Section 2.1.2,
      enabling the symmetric key to be encoded using any of the formats
      defined by the derived identities.

   *  The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be
      cleartext, encrypted, or hidden, as follows:

      -  The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node can encode any cleartext key
         value.

      -  The "hidden-symmetric-key" node is of type "empty" as the real
         value cannot be presented via the management interface.

      -  The "encrypted-symmetric-key" node's structure is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.1.

2.1.4.4.  The "public-key-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "public-key-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram does not expand
   any internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping public-key-grouping:
       +-- public-key-format    identityref
       +-- public-key           binary

   Comments:

   *  The "public-key-format" node is an identity-reference to the
      "public-key-format" abstract base identity discussed in
      Section 2.1.2, enabling the public key to be encoded using any of
      the formats defined by the derived identities.

   *  The "public-key" node is the public key data in the selected
      format.  No "choice" statement is used to hide or encrypt the
      public key data because it is unnecessary to do so for public
      keys.

2.1.4.5.  The "private-key-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "private-key-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram does not expand
   the internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping private-key-grouping:
       +-- private-key-format?            identityref
       +-- (private-key-type)
          +--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}?
          |  +-- cleartext-private-key?   binary
          +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}?
          |  +-- hidden-private-key?      empty
          +--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}?
             +-- encrypted-private-key
                +---u encrypted-value-grouping

   Comments:

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "encrypted-value-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.1.

   *  The "private-key-format" node is an identity-reference to the
      "private-key-format" abstract base identity discussed in
      Section 2.1.2, enabling the private key to be encoded using any of
      the formats defined by the derived identities.

   *  The "choice" statement enables the private key data to be
      cleartext, encrypted, or hidden, as follows:

      -  The "cleartext-private-key" node can encode any cleartext key
         value.

      -  The "hidden-private-key" node is of type "empty" as the real
         value cannot be presented via the management interface.

      -  The "encrypted-private-key" node's structure is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.1.

2.1.4.6.  The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram does not
   expand the internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping:
       +---u public-key-grouping
       +---u private-key-grouping

   Comments:

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "public-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.4.

      -  The "private-key-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.5.

2.1.4.7.  The "certificate-expiration-grouping" Grouping

   The following

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates illustrating the "certificate-
   expiration-grouping"
   "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping:

     grouping certificate-expiration-grouping:
       +---n certificate-expiration
               {certificate-expiration-notification}?
          +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time

   Comments:

   *  This grouping's only purpose is to define the "certificate-
      expiration" notification statement, used by the groupings defined
      in Section Sections 2.1.4.8 and Section 2.1.4.9.

   *  The "certificate-expiration" notification enables servers to
      notify clients when certificates are nearing expiration.

   *  The "expiration-date" node indicates when the designated
      certificate will (or did) expire.

   *  Identification of the certificate that is expiring is built into
      the notification itself.  For an example, please see
      Section 2.2.3.

2.1.4.8.  The "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "trust-anchor-cert-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram does not
   expand the internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping:
       +-- cert-data?                         trust-anchor-cert-cms
       +---u certificate-expiration-grouping

   Comments:

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.7.

   *  The "cert-data" node contains a chain of one or more certificates
      containing at most one self-signed certificates certificate (the "root"
      certificate), encoded using a "signed-data-cms" typedef discussed
      in Section 2.1.3.

2.1.4.9.  The "end-entity-cert-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the "end-
   entity-cert-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram does not expand
   the internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping end-entity-cert-grouping:
       +-- cert-data?                         end-entity-cert-cms
       +---u certificate-expiration-grouping

   Comments:

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "certificate-expiration-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.7.

   *  The "cert-data" node contains a chain of one or more certificates
      containing at most one certificate that is neither not self-signed nor
      having and
      does not have Basic constraint "CA true", true" (where "CA" means
      Certification Authority), encoded using a "signed-data-
      cms" "signed-data-cms"
      typedef discussed in Section 2.1.3.

2.1.4.10.  The "generate-csr-grouping" Grouping

   The following

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates illustrating the "generate-csr-
   grouping"
   "generate-csr-grouping" grouping:

     grouping generate-csr-grouping:
       +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}?
          +---w input
          |  +---w csr-format    identityref
          |  +---w csr-info      csr-info
          +--ro output
             +--ro (csr-type)
                +--:(p10-csr)
                   +--ro p10-csr?   p10-csr

   Comments:

   *  This grouping's only purpose is to define the "generate-
      certificate-signing-request" "generate-csr"
      action statement, used by the groupings defined in Section Sections
      2.1.4.11 and Section 2.1.4.12.

   *  This action takes as two input parameters: a "csr-info" type "csr-info” parameter,
      for what content should be in the certificate, and returns a "csr"
      type, both of which “csr-format”
      parameter, for what CSR format to return.  The action returns the
      CSR in the specified format.  Both the “csr-info” and “csr” types
      are discussed in Section 2.1.3.

   *  For an example, please see Section 2.2.2.

2.1.4.11.  The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping.  This tree diagram
   does not expand the internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping:
       +---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
       +---u end-entity-cert-grouping
       +---u generate-csr-grouping

   Comments:

   *  This grouping defines an asymmetric key with at most one
      associated certificate, a commonly needed combination in protocol
      models.

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.6.

      -  The "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.9.

      -  The "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.10.

2.1.4.12.  The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" Grouping

   This section presents a tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrating the
   "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" grouping.  This tree
   diagram does not expand the internally used grouping "grouping" statement(s):

     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping:
       +---u asymmetric-key-pair-grouping
       +-- certificates
       |  +-- certificate* [name]
       |     +-- name? name                       string
       |     +---u end-entity-cert-grouping
       +---u generate-csr-grouping

   Comments:

   *  This grouping defines an asymmetric key with one or more
      associated certificates, a commonly needed combination in
      configuration models.

   *  For the referenced grouping "grouping" statement(s):

      -  The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.6.

      -  The "end-entity-cert-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.9.

      -  The "generate-csr-grouping" grouping is discussed in
         Section 2.1.4.10.

2.1.5.  Protocol-accessible  Protocol-Accessible Nodes

   The "ietf-crypto-types" module does not contain any protocol-
   accessible nodes, but the module needs to be "implemented", as
   described in Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], in order for the identities
   in Section 2.1.2 to be defined.

2.2.  Example Usage

2.2.1.  The "symmetric-key-grouping", "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-
        grouping", and "password-grouping" Groupings

   The following non-normative module is constructed in order to
   illustrate the use of the "symmetric-key-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.3),
   the "asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.12), and
   the "password-grouping" (Section 2.1.4.2) grouping "grouping" statements.

   Notably, this example module and associated configuration data
   illustrates that a hidden private key (ex-hidden-asymmetric-key) has
   been used to encrypt a symmetric key (ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-
   based-symmetric-key) that has been used to encrypt another private
   key (ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key).  Additionally, the
   symmetric key is also used to encrypt a password (ex-encrypted-
   password).

2.2.1.1.  Example Module

   module ex-crypto-types-usage {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage";
     prefix ectu;

     import ietf-crypto-types {
       prefix ct;
       reference
         "RFC AAAA: 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
     }

     organization
       "Example Corporation";
     contact
       "YANG Designer <mailto:yang.designer@example.com>";

     description
       "This example module illustrates the 'symmetric-key-grouping'
        and 'asymmetric-key-grouping' groupings defined in the
       'ietf-crypto-types' module defined in RFC AAAA."; 9640.";

     revision 2024-03-16 {
       description
         "Initial version"; version.";
       reference
         "RFC AAAA: Common 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
     }

     container symmetric-keys {
       description
         "A container of symmetric keys.";
       list symmetric-key {
         key "name";
         description
           "A symmetric key"; key.";
         leaf name {
           type string;
           description
             "An arbitrary name for this key.";
         }
         uses ct:symmetric-key-grouping {
           augment "key-type/encrypted-symmetric-key/"
                 + "encrypted-symmetric-key/encrypted-by" {
             description
               "Augments in a choice 'choice' statement enabling the
                encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
                asymmetric key.";
             uses encrypted-by-grouping;
           }
         }
       }
     }
     container asymmetric-keys {
       description
         "A container of asymmetric keys.";
       list asymmetric-key {
         key "name";
         leaf name {
           type string;
           description
             "An arbitrary name for this key.";
         }
         uses ct:asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
           augment "private-key-type/encrypted-private-key/"
                 + "encrypted-private-key/encrypted-by" {
             description
               "Augments in a choice 'choice' statement enabling the
                encrypting key to be any other symmetric or
                asymmetric key.";
             uses encrypted-by-grouping;
           }
         }
         description
           "An asymmetric key pair with associated certificates.";
       }
     }
     container passwords {
       description
         "A container of passwords.";
       list password {
         key "name";
         leaf name {
           type string;
           description
             "An arbitrary name for this password.";
         }
         uses ct:password-grouping {
           augment "password-type/encrypted-password/"
                 + "encrypted-password/encrypted-by" {
             description
               "Augments in a choice 'choice' statement enabling the
                encrypting key to be any symmetric or
                asymmetric key.";
             uses encrypted-by-grouping;
           }
         }
         description
           "A password.";
       }
     }

     grouping encrypted-by-grouping {
       description
         "A grouping that defines a choice enabling references
          to other keys.";
       choice encrypted-by {
         mandatory true;
         description
           "A choice amongst other symmetric or asymmetric keys.";
         case symmetric-key-ref {
           leaf symmetric-key-ref {
             type leafref {
               path "/ectu:symmetric-keys/ectu:symmetric-key/"
                  + "ectu:name";
             }
             description
               "Identifies the symmetric key that encrypts this key.";
           }
         }
         case asymmetric-key-ref {
           leaf asymmetric-key-ref {
             type leafref {
               path "/ectu:asymmetric-keys/ectu:asymmetric-key/"
                  + "ectu:name";
             }
             description
               "Identifies the asymmetric key that encrypts this key.";
           }
         }
       }
     }
   }

2.2.1.2.  Tree Diagram for the Example Module

   The tree diagram [RFC8340] for this example module is as follows:

   module: ex-crypto-types-usage
     +--rw symmetric-keys
     |  +--rw symmetric-key* [name]
     |     +--rw name                             string
     |     +--rw key-format?                      identityref
     |     +--rw (key-type)
     |        +--:(cleartext-symmetric-key)
     |        |  +--rw cleartext-symmetric-key?   binary
     |        |          {cleartext-symmetric-keys}?
     |        +--:(hidden-symmetric-key) {hidden-symmetric-keys}?
     |        |  +--rw hidden-symmetric-key?      empty
     |        +--:(encrypted-symmetric-key) {encrypted-symmetric-keys}?
     |           +--rw encrypted-symmetric-key
     |              +--rw encrypted-by
     |              |  +--rw (encrypted-by)
     |              |     +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
     |              |     |  +--rw symmetric-key-ref?    leafref
     |              |     +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
     |              |        +--rw asymmetric-key-ref?   leafref
     |              +--rw encrypted-value-format    identityref
     |              +--rw encrypted-value           binary
     +--rw asymmetric-keys
     |  +--rw asymmetric-key* [name]
     |     +--rw name                           string
     |     +--rw public-key-format?             identityref
     |     +--rw public-key?                    binary
     |     +--rw private-key-format?            identityref
     |     +--rw (private-key-type)
     |     |  +--:(cleartext-private-key) {cleartext-private-keys}?
     |     |  |  +--rw cleartext-private-key?   binary
     |     |  +--:(hidden-private-key) {hidden-private-keys}?
     |     |  |  +--rw hidden-private-key?      empty
     |     |  +--:(encrypted-private-key) {encrypted-private-keys}?
     |     |     +--rw encrypted-private-key
     |     |        +--rw encrypted-by
     |     |        |  +--rw (encrypted-by)
     |     |        |     +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
     |     |        |     |  +--rw symmetric-key-ref?    leafref
     |     |        |     +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
     |     |        |        +--rw asymmetric-key-ref?   leafref
     |     |        +--rw encrypted-value-format    identityref
     |     |        +--rw encrypted-value           binary
     |     +--rw certificates
     |     |  +--rw certificate* [name]
     |     |     +--rw name                      string
     |     |     +--rw cert-data                 end-entity-cert-cms
     |     |     +---n certificate-expiration
     |     |             {certificate-expiration-notification}?
     |     |        +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time
     |     +---x generate-csr {csr-generation}?
     |        +---w input
     |        |  +---w csr-format    identityref
     |        |  +---w csr-info      csr-info
     |        +--ro output
     |           +--ro (csr-type)
     |              +--:(p10-csr)
     |                 +--ro p10-csr?   p10-csr
     +--rw passwords
        +--rw password* [name]
           +--rw name                        string
           +--rw (password-type)
              +--:(cleartext-password) {cleartext-passwords}?
              |  +--rw cleartext-password?   string
              +--:(encrypted-password) {encrypted-passwords}?
                 +--rw encrypted-password
                    +--rw encrypted-by
                    |  +--rw (encrypted-by)
                    |     +--:(symmetric-key-ref)
                    |     |  +--rw symmetric-key-ref?    leafref
                    |     +--:(asymmetric-key-ref)
                    |        +--rw asymmetric-key-ref?   leafref
                    +--rw encrypted-value-format    identityref
                    +--rw encrypted-value           binary

2.2.1.3.  Usage Example for the Example Module

   Finally, the following example illustrates various symmetric and
   asymmetric keys as they might appear in configuration: configuration.

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   <symmetric-keys
     xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
     xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
     <symmetric-key>
       <name>ex-hidden-symmetric-key</name>
       <hidden-symmetric-key/>
     </symmetric-key>
     <symmetric-key>
       <name>ex-octet-string-based-symmetric-key</name>
       <key-format>ct:octet-string-key-format</key-format>
       <cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key>
     </symmetric-key>
     <symmetric-key>
       <name>ex-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name>
       <key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format>
       <cleartext-symmetric-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-symmetric-key>
     </symmetric-key>
     <symmetric-key>
       <name>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetric-key</name>
       <key-format>ct:one-symmetric-key-format</key-format>
       <encrypted-symmetric-key>
         <encrypted-by>
           <asymmetric-key-ref>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key\
   -ref>
         </encrypted-by>
         <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-enveloped-data-format</encrypte\
   d-value-format>
         <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
       </encrypted-symmetric-key>
     </symmetric-key>
   </symmetric-keys>

   <asymmetric-keys
     xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
     xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
     <asymmetric-key>
       <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
       <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
   -format>
       <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
       <hidden-private-key/>
       <certificates>
         <certificate>
           <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name>
           <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data>
         </certificate>
       </certificates>
     </asymmetric-key>
     <asymmetric-key>
       <name>ex-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name>
       <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
   -format>
       <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
       <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\
   t>
       <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
       <certificates>
         <certificate>
           <name>ex-cert</name>
           <cert-data>BASE64VALUE=</cert-data>
         </certificate>
       </certificates>
     </asymmetric-key>
     <asymmetric-key>
       <name>ex-one-asymmetric-based-asymmetric-key</name>
       <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
   -format>
       <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
       <private-key-format>ct:one-asymmetric-key-format</private-key-fo\
   rmat>
       <cleartext-private-key>BASE64VALUE=</cleartext-private-key>
     </asymmetric-key>
     <asymmetric-key>
       <name>ex-encrypted-rsa-based-asymmetric-key</name>
       <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public-key\
   -format>
       <public-key>BASE64VALUE=</public-key>
       <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-forma\
   t>
       <encrypted-private-key>
         <encrypted-by>
           <symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
   c-key</symmetric-key-ref>
         </encrypted-by>
         <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\
   d-value-format>
         <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
       </encrypted-private-key>
     </asymmetric-key>
   </asymmetric-keys>

   <passwords
     xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"
     xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
     <password>
       <name>ex-cleartext-password</name>
       <cleartext-password>super-secret</cleartext-password>
     </password>
     <password>
       <name>ex-encrypted-password</name>
       <encrypted-password>
         <encrypted-by>
           <symmetric-key-ref>ex-encrypted-one-symmetric-based-symmetri\
   c-key</symmetric-key-ref>
         </encrypted-by>
         <encrypted-value-format>ct:cms-encrypted-data-format</encrypte\
   d-value-format>
         <encrypted-value>BASE64VALUE=</encrypted-value>
       </encrypted-password>
     </password>
   </passwords>

2.2.2.  The "generate-certificate-signing-request" "generate-csr" Action

   The following example illustrates the "generate-certificate-signing-
   request" "generate-csr" action,
   discussed in Section 2.1.4.10, with the NETCONF protocol.

   REQUEST

   <rpc message-id="101"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"
     xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
     <action xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:1">
       <asymmetric-keys
         xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage">
         <asymmetric-key>
           <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
           <generate-csr>
             <csr-format>ct:p10-csr-format</csr-format>
             <csr-info>BASE64VALUE=</csr-info>
           </generate-csr>
         </asymmetric-key>
       </asymmetric-keys>
     </action>
   </rpc>

   RESPONSE

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   <rpc-reply message-id="101"
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
     <p10-csr xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-types-usage"\
   >BASE64VALUE=</p10-csr>
   </rpc-reply>

2.2.3.  The "certificate-expiration" Notification

   The following example illustrates the "certificate-expiration"
   notification, discussed in Section 2.1.4.7, with the NETCONF
   protocol.

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   <notification
     xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:notification:1.0">
     <eventTime>2018-05-25T00:01:00Z</eventTime>
     <asymmetric-keys xmlns="https://example.com/ns/example-crypto-type\
   s-usage">
       <asymmetric-key>
         <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key</name>
         <certificates>
           <certificate>
             <name>ex-hidden-asymmetric-key-cert</name>
             <certificate-expiration>
               <expiration-date>2018-08-05T14:18:53-05:00</expiration-d\
   ate>
             </certificate-expiration>
           </certificate>
         </certificates>
       </asymmetric-key>
     </asymmetric-keys>
   </notification>

2.3.  YANG Module

   This module has normative references to [RFC2119], [RFC2986],
   [RFC4253], [RFC5280], [RFC5652], [RFC5915], [RFC5958], [RFC6031],
   [RFC6960], [RFC6991], [RFC7093], [RFC8017], [RFC8174], [RFC8341], and
   [ITU.X690.2021].

   <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-crypto-types@2024-03-16.yang"
   module ietf-crypto-types {
     yang-version 1.1;
     namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types";
     prefix ct;

     import ietf-yang-types {
       prefix yang;
       reference
         "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
     }

     import ietf-netconf-acm {
       prefix nacm;
       reference
         "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
     }

     organization
       "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";

     contact
       "WG Web:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf
        WG List:  NETCONF WG list <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
        Author:   Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>";

     description
       "This module defines common YANG types for cryptographic
        applications.

        The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
        'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
        'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
        are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
        (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
        capitals, as shown here.

        Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified
        as authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

        Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
        or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
        subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised
        BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
        Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
        (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

        This version of this YANG module is part of RFC AAAA
        (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcAAAA); 9640
        (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9640); see the RFC
        itself for full legal notices.

        The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
        'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
        'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
        are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
        (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
        capitals, as shown here."; notices.";

     revision 2024-03-16 {
       description
         "Initial version"; version.";
       reference
         "RFC AAAA: 9640: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
     }

     /****************/
     /*   Features   */
     /****************/

     feature one-symmetric-key-format {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports the
          'one-symmetric-key-format' identity.";
     }

     feature one-asymmetric-key-format {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports the
          'one-asymmetric-key-format' identity.";
     }

     feature symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports the
          'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
     }

     feature asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports the
          'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' identity.";
     }

     feature cms-enveloped-data-format {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports the
          'cms-enveloped-data-format' identity.";
     }

     feature cms-encrypted-data-format {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports the
          'cms-encrypted-data-format' identity.";
     }

     feature p10-csr-format {
       description
         "Indicates that the server implements support
          for generating P10-based CSRs, as defined
          in RFC 2986.";
       reference
         "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                    Specification Version 1.7";
     }

     feature csr-generation {
       description
         "Indicates that the server implements the
          'generate-csr' action.";
     }

     feature certificate-expiration-notification {
       description
         "Indicates that the server implements the
          'certificate-expiration' notification.";
     }

     feature cleartext-passwords {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports cleartext
          passwords.";
     }

     feature encrypted-passwords {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports password
          encryption.";
     }

     feature cleartext-symmetric-keys {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports cleartext
          symmetric keys.";
     }

     feature hidden-symmetric-keys {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports hidden keys.";
     }

     feature encrypted-symmetric-keys {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports encryption
          of symmetric keys.";
     }

     feature cleartext-private-keys {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports cleartext
          private keys.";
     }

     feature hidden-private-keys {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports hidden keys.";
     }

     feature encrypted-private-keys {
       description
         "Indicates that the server supports encryption
          of private keys.";
     }

     /*************************************************/
     /*   Base Identities for Key Format Structures   */
     /*************************************************/

     identity symmetric-key-format {
       description
         "Base key-format identity for symmetric keys.";
     }

     identity public-key-format {
       description
         "Base key-format identity for public keys.";
     }

     identity private-key-format {
       description
         "Base key-format identity for private keys.";
     }

     /****************************************************/
     /*   Identities for Private Key Format Structures   */
     /****************************************************/

     identity rsa-private-key-format {
       base private-key-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the private key value is encoded as
          an RSAPrivateKey (from RFC 8017), encoded using ASN.1
          distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
          ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 8017:
            PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     identity ec-private-key-format {
       base private-key-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the private key value is encoded as
          an ECPrivateKey (from RFC 5915), encoded using ASN.1
          distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
          ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5915:
            Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     identity one-asymmetric-key-format {
       if-feature "one-asymmetric-key-format";
       base private-key-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the private key value is a CMS
          Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) OneAsymmetricKey
          structure, as defined in RFC 5958, encoded using
          ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER), as
          specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5958:
            Asymmetric Key Packages
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     /***************************************************/
     /*   Identities for Public Key Format Structures   */
     /***************************************************/

     identity ssh-public-key-format {
       base public-key-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the public key value is an SSH a Secure Shell (SSH)
          public key, as specified by in RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.:

            string    certificate or public key format
                      identifier
            byte[n]   key/certificate data.";
       reference
         "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol";
     }

     identity subject-public-key-info-format {
       base public-key-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the public key value is a SubjectPublicKeyInfo
          structure, as described in RFC 5280 5280, encoded using ASN.1
          distinguished encoding rules (DER), as specified in
          ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5280:
            Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
            and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     /******************************************************/
     /*   Identities for Symmetric Key Format Structures   */
     /******************************************************/

     identity octet-string-key-format {
       base symmetric-key-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the key is encoded as a raw octet string.
          The length of the octet string MUST be appropriate for
          the associated algorithm's block size.

          The identity of the associated algorithm is outside the
          scope of this specification.  This is also true when
          the octet string has been encrypted.";
     }

     identity one-symmetric-key-format {
       if-feature "one-symmetric-key-format";
       base symmetric-key-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the private key value is a CMS
          OneSymmetricKey structure, as defined in RFC 6031,
          encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
          (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 6031:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
            Symmetric Key Package Content Type
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     /*************************************************/
     /*   Identities for Encrypted Value Structures   */
     /*************************************************/

     identity encrypted-value-format {
       description
         "Base format identity for encrypted values.";
     }

     identity symmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
       if-feature "symmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
       base encrypted-value-format;
       description
         "Base format identity for symmetrically encrypted
          values.";
     }

     identity asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format {
       if-feature "asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format";
       base encrypted-value-format;
       description
         "Base format identity for asymmetrically encrypted
          values.";
     }

     identity cms-encrypted-data-format {
       if-feature "cms-encrypted-data-format";
       base symmetrically-encrypted-value-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to
          the 'encrypted-data-cms' type with the constraint
          that the 'unprotectedAttrs' value is not set.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     identity cms-enveloped-data-format {
       if-feature "cms-enveloped-data-format";
       base asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format;
       description
         "Indicates that the encrypted value conforms to the
          'enveloped-data-cms' type with the following constraints:

          The EnvelopedData structure MUST have exactly one
          'RecipientInfo'.

          If the asymmetric key supports public key cryptography
          (e.g., RSA), then the 'RecipientInfo' must be a
          'KeyTransRecipientInfo' with the 'RecipientIdentifier'
          using a 'subjectKeyIdentifier' with the value set using
          'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the recipient's public key.

          Otherwise, if the asymmetric key supports key agreement
          (e.g., ECC), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)), then the
          'RecipientInfo' must be a 'KeyAgreeRecipientInfo'.  The
          'OriginatorIdentifierOrKey' value must use the
          'OriginatorPublicKey' alternative.  The
          'UserKeyingMaterial' value must not be present.  There
          must be exactly one 'RecipientEncryptedKeys' value
          having the 'KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier' set to 'rKeyId'
          with the value set using 'method 1' in RFC 7093 over the
          recipient's public key.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
          RFC 7093:
            Additional Methods for Generating Key
            Identifiers Values
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     /*********************************************************/
     /*   Identities for Certificate Signing Request Formats  */
     /*********************************************************/

     identity csr-format {
       description
         "A base identity for the certificate signing request
          formats.  Additional derived identities MAY be defined
          by future efforts.";
     }

     identity p10-csr-format {
       if-feature "p10-csr-format";
       base csr-format;
       description
         "Indicates the 'CertificationRequest' CertificationRequest structure
          defined in RFC 2986.";
       reference
         "RFC 2986: PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
                    Specification Version 1.7";
     }

     /***************************************************/
     /*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 2986   */
     /***************************************************/

     typedef csr-info {
       type binary;
       description
         "A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
          RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
          rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 2986:
            PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax
            Specification Version 1.7
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     typedef p10-csr {
       type binary;
       description
         "A CertificationRequest structure, as specified in
          RFC 2986, encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding
          rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 2986:
            PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
            Version 1.7
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     /***************************************************/
     /*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 5280   */
     /***************************************************/

     typedef x509 {
       type binary;
       description
         "A Certificate structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
          encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
          as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5280:
            Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
            and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     typedef crl {
       type binary;
       description
         "A CertificateList structure, as specified in RFC 5280,
          encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
          as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5280:
            Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
            and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     /***************************************************/
     /*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from RFC 6960   */
     /***************************************************/

     typedef oscp-request {
       type binary;
       description
         "A OCSPRequest structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
          encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
          (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 6960:
            X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
            Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     typedef oscp-response {
       type binary;
       description
         "A OCSPResponse structure, as specified in RFC 6960,
          encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules
          (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 6960:
            X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
            Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     /***********************************************/
     /*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures from 5652   */
     /***********************************************/

     typedef cms {
       type binary;
       description
         "A ContentInfo structure, as specified in RFC 5652,
          encoded using ASN.1 distinguished encoding rules (DER),
          as specified in ITU-T X.690.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
          ITU-T X.690:
            Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
            Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
            Encoding Rules (DER) 02/2021."; 02/2021";
     }

     typedef data-content-cms {
       type cms;
       description
         "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
          data content type, as described by in Section 4 in of RFC 5652.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     typedef signed-data-cms {
       type cms;
       description
         "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
          signed-data content type, as described by in Section 5 in of
          RFC 5652.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     typedef enveloped-data-cms {
       type cms;
       description
         "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
          enveloped-data content type, as described by in Section 6
          in
          of RFC 5652.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     typedef digested-data-cms {
       type cms;
       description
         "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
          digested-data content type, as described by in Section 7
          in
          of RFC 5652.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     typedef encrypted-data-cms {
       type cms;
       description
         "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
          encrypted-data content type, as described by in Section 8
          in
          of RFC 5652.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     typedef authenticated-data-cms {
       type cms;
       description
         "A CMS structure whose top-most content type MUST be the
          authenticated-data content type, as described by in Section 9
          in
          of RFC 5652.";
       reference
         "RFC 5652: Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     /*********************************************************/
     /*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5280   */
     /*********************************************************/

     typedef trust-anchor-cert-x509 {
       type x509;
       description
         "A Certificate structure that MUST encode a self-signed
          root certificate.";
     }

     typedef end-entity-cert-x509 {
       type x509;
       description
         "A Certificate structure that MUST encode a certificate
          that is neither self-signed nor having has Basic constraint
          CA true.";
     }

     /*********************************************************/
     /*   Typedefs for ASN.1 structures related to RFC 5652   */
     /*********************************************************/

     typedef trust-anchor-cert-cms {
       type signed-data-cms;
       description
         "A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the chain of
          X.509 certificates needed to authenticate the certificate
          presented by a client or end-entity. end entity.

          The CMS MUST contain only a single chain of certificates.
          The client or end-entity certificate MUST only authenticate
          to the last intermediate CA certificate listed in the chain.

          In all cases, the chain MUST include a self-signed root
          certificate.  In the case where the root certificate is
          itself the issuer of the client or end-entity certificate,
          only one certificate is present.

          This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
          used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
          policy) revocation objects with which the device can
          verify the revocation status of the certificates.

          This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
          structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly used
          to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation objects
          (RFC 5280).";
       reference
         "RFC 5280:
            Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
            and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. Profile
          RFC 5652:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     typedef end-entity-cert-cms {
       type signed-data-cms;
       description
         "A CMS SignedData structure that MUST contain the end
          entity end-entity
          certificate itself, itself and MAY contain any number
          of intermediate certificates leading up to a trust
          anchor certificate.  The trust anchor certificate
          MAY be included as well.

          The CMS MUST contain a single end entity end-entity certificate.
          The CMS MUST NOT contain any spurious certificates.

          This CMS structure MAY (as applicable where this type is
          used) also contain suitably fresh (as defined by local
          policy) revocation objects with which the device can
          verify the revocation status of the certificates.

          This CMS encodes the degenerate form of the SignedData
          structure (RFC 5652, Section 5.2) that is commonly
          used to disseminate X.509 certificates and revocation
          objects (RFC 5280).";

       reference
         "RFC 5280:
            Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
            and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. Profile
          RFC 5652:
            Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
     }

     /*****************/
     /*   Groupings   */
     /*****************/

     grouping encrypted-value-grouping {
       description
         "A reusable grouping for a value that has been encrypted by
          a referenced symmetric or asymmetric key.";
       container encrypted-by {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         description
           "An empty container enabling a reference to the key that
            encrypted the value to be augmented in.  The referenced
            key MUST be a symmetric key or an asymmetric key.

            A symmetric key MUST be referenced via a leaf node called
            'symmetric-key-ref'.  An asymmetric key MUST be referenced
            via a leaf node called 'asymmetric-key-ref'.

            The leaf nodes MUST be direct descendants in the data tree, tree
            and MAY be direct descendants in the schema tree (e.g.,
            choice/case
            'choice'/'case' statements are allowed, allowed but not a
            container).";
       }
       leaf encrypted-value-format {
         type identityref {
           base encrypted-value-format;
         }
         mandatory true;
         description
           "Identifies the format of the 'encrypted-value' leaf.

            If 'encrypted-by' points to a symmetric key, then a
            'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format' based an
            identity based on 'symmetrically-encrypted-value-format'
            MUST be set (e.g., cms-encrypted-data-format). 'cms-encrypted-data-format').

            If 'encrypted-by' points to an asymmetric key, then an
            'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format' based
            identity based on 'asymmetrically-encrypted-value-format'
            MUST be set (e.g., cms-enveloped-data-format)."; 'cms-enveloped-data-format').";
       }
       leaf encrypted-value {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         type binary;
         must '../encrypted-by';
         mandatory true;
         description
           "The value, encrypted using the referenced symmetric
            or asymmetric key.  The value MUST be encoded using
            the format associated with the 'encrypted-value-format'
            leaf.";
       }
     }

     grouping password-grouping {
       description
         "A password used for authenticating to a remote system.

          The 'ianach:crypt-hash' typedef from RFC 7317 should be
          used instead when needing a password to authencate authenticate a
          local account.";
       choice password-type {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "Choice between password types.";
         case cleartext-password {
           if-feature "cleartext-passwords";
           leaf cleartext-password {
             nacm:default-deny-all;
             type string;
             description
               "The cleartext value of the password.";
           }
         }
         case encrypted-password {
           if-feature "encrypted-passwords";
           container encrypted-password {
             description
               "A container for the encrypted password value.";
             uses encrypted-value-grouping;
           }
         }
       }
     }

     grouping symmetric-key-grouping {
       description
         "A symmetric key.";
       leaf key-format {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         type identityref {
           base symmetric-key-format;
         }
         description
           "Identifies the symmetric key's format.  Implementations
            SHOULD ensure that the incoming symmetric key value is
            encoded in the specified format.

            For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's
            format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the
            encrypted key's format."; format).";
       }
       choice key-type {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "Choice between key types.";
         case cleartext-symmetric-key {
           leaf cleartext-symmetric-key {
             if-feature "cleartext-symmetric-keys";
             nacm:default-deny-all;
             type binary;
             must '../key-format';
             description
               "The binary value of the key.  The interpretation of
                the value is defined by the 'key-format' field.";
           }
         }
         case hidden-symmetric-key {
           if-feature "hidden-symmetric-keys";
           leaf hidden-symmetric-key {
             type empty;
             must 'not(../key-format)';
             description
               "A hidden key is not exportable, exportable and not extractable,
                and extractable;
                therefore, it is of type 'empty' as its value is
                inaccessible via management interfaces.  Though hidden
                to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and
                may be referenced by configuration to indicate which
                key a server should use for a cryptographic operation.
                How such keys are created is outside the scope of this
                module.";
           }
         }
         case encrypted-symmetric-key {
           if-feature "encrypted-symmetric-keys";
           container encrypted-symmetric-key {
             must '../key-format';
             description
               "A container for the encrypted symmetric key value.
                The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value' node
                is via the 'key-format' node";
             uses encrypted-value-grouping;
           }
         }
       }
     }

     grouping public-key-grouping {
       description
         "A public key.";
       leaf public-key-format {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         type identityref {
           base public-key-format;
         }
         mandatory true;
         description
           "Identifies the public key's format.  Implementations SHOULD
            ensure that the incoming public key value is encoded in the
            specified format.";
       }
       leaf public-key {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         type binary;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "The binary value of the public key.  The interpretation
            of the value is defined by the 'public-key-format' field.";
       }
     }

     grouping private-key-grouping {
       description
         "A private key.";
       leaf private-key-format {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         type identityref {
           base private-key-format;
         }
         description
           "Identifies the private key's format.  Implementations SHOULD
            ensure that the incoming private key value is encoded in the
            specified format.

            For encrypted keys, the value is the decrypted key's
            format (i.e., the 'encrypted-value-format' conveys the
            encrypted key's format."; format).";
       }
       choice private-key-type {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         mandatory true;
         description
           "Choice between key types.";
         case cleartext-private-key {
           if-feature "cleartext-private-keys";
           leaf cleartext-private-key {
             nacm:default-deny-all;
             type binary;
             must '../private-key-format';
             description
               "The value of the binary key key.  The key's value is
                interpreted by the 'private-key-format' field.";
           }
         }
         case hidden-private-key {
           if-feature "hidden-private-keys";
           leaf hidden-private-key {
             type empty;
             must 'not(../private-key-format)';
             description
               "A hidden key.  It is of type 'empty' as its value is
                inaccessible via management interfaces.  Though hidden
                to users, such keys are not hidden to the server and
                and
                may be referenced by configuration to indicate which
                key a server should use for a cryptographic operation.
                How such keys are created is outside the scope of this
                module.";
           }
         }
         case encrypted-private-key {
           if-feature "encrypted-private-keys";
           container encrypted-private-key {
             must '../private-key-format';
             description
               "A container for the encrypted asymmetric private key
                value.  The interpretation of the 'encrypted-value'
                node is via the 'private-key-format' node";
             uses encrypted-value-grouping;
           }
         }
       }
     }

     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
       description
         "A private key and, optionally, its associated public key.
          Implementations MUST ensure that the two keys, when both
          are specified, are a matching pair.";
       uses public-key-grouping {
         refine public-key-format "public-key-format" {
           mandatory false;
         }
         refine public-key "public-key" {
           mandatory false;
         }
       }
       uses private-key-grouping;
     }

     grouping certificate-expiration-grouping {
       description
         "A notification for when a certificate is about to, to expire or
          has already has, expired.";
       notification certificate-expiration {
         if-feature "certificate-expiration-notification";
         description
           "A notification indicating that the configured certificate
            is either about to expire or has already expired.  When to
            send notifications is an implementation specific implementation-specific decision,
            but it is RECOMMENDED that a notification be sent once a
            month for 3 months, then once a week for four weeks, and
            then once a day thereafter until the issue is resolved.

            If the certificate's Issuer issuer maintains a Certificate
            Revocation List (CRL), the expiration notification MAY
            be sent if the CRL is about to expire.";
         leaf expiration-date {
           type yang:date-and-time;
           mandatory true;
           description
             "Identifies the expiration date on the certificate.";
         }
       }
     }

     grouping trust-anchor-cert-grouping {
       description
         "A trust anchor certificate, certificate and a notification for when
          it is about to (or expire or has already has) expire."; expired.";
       leaf cert-data {
         nacm:default-deny-all;
         type trust-anchor-cert-cms;
         description
           "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
       }
       uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
     }

     grouping end-entity-cert-grouping {
       description
         "An end entity certificate, end-entity certificate and a notification for when
          it is about to (or expire or has already has) expire. expired.  Implementations
          SHOULD assert that, where used, the end entity end-entity certificate
          contains the expected public key.";
       leaf cert-data {
         nacm:default-deny-all;
         type end-entity-cert-cms;
         description
           "The binary certificate data for this certificate.";
       }
       uses certificate-expiration-grouping;
     }

     grouping generate-csr-grouping {
       description
         "Defines the 'generate-csr' action.";
       action generate-csr {
         if-feature "csr-generation";
         nacm:default-deny-all;
         description
           "Generates a certificate signing request structure for
            the associated asymmetric key using the passed subject
            and attribute values.

            This action 'action' statement is only available when the
            associated 'public-key-format' node's value is
            'subject-public-key-info-format'.";
         input {
           leaf csr-format {
             type identityref {
               base csr-format;
             }
             mandatory true;
             description
               "Specifies the format for the returned certificate.";
           }
           leaf csr-info {
             type csr-info;
             mandatory true;
             description
               "A CertificationRequestInfo structure, as defined in
                RFC 2986.

                Enables the client to provide a fully-populated fully populated
                CertificationRequestInfo structure that the server
                only needs to sign in order to generate the complete
                'CertificationRequest'
                CertificationRequest structure to return in the
                'output'.

                The 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field contained inside
                the 'SubjectPublicKeyInfo' field MUST be one known
                to be supported by the device.";
             reference
               "RFC 2986:
                  PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
                RFC AAAA: 9640:
                  YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
           }
         }
         output {
           choice csr-type {
             mandatory true;
             description
               "A choice amongst certificate signing request formats.
                Additional formats MAY be augmented into this 'choice'
                statement by future efforts.";
             case p10-csr {
               leaf p10-csr {
                 type p10-csr;
                 description
                   "A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986.";
               }
               description
                 "A CertificationRequest, as defined in RFC 2986.";
               reference
                 "RFC 2986:
                    PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification
                  RFC AAAA: 9640:
                    YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
             }
           }
         }
       }
     } // generate-csr-grouping

     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping {
       description
         "A private/public key pair and an associated certificate.
          Implementations MUST assert that the certificate contains
          the matching public key.";
       uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
       uses end-entity-cert-grouping;
       uses generate-csr-grouping;
     } // asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping

     grouping asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping {
       description
         "A private/public key pair and a list of associated
          certificates.  Implementations MUST assert that
          certificates contain the matching public key.";
       uses asymmetric-key-pair-grouping;
       container certificates {
         nacm:default-deny-write;
         description
           "Certificates associated with this asymmetric key.";
         list certificate {
           key "name";
           description
             "A certificate for this asymmetric key.";
           leaf name {
             type string;
             description
               "An arbitrary name for the certificate.";
           }
           uses end-entity-cert-grouping {
             refine "cert-data" {
               mandatory true;
             }
           }
         }
       }
       uses generate-csr-grouping;
     } // asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping

   }
   <CODE ENDS>

3.  Security Considerations

3.1.  No Support for CRMF

   This document uses PKCS #10 [RFC2986] for the "generate-certificate-
   signing-request" "generate-csr" action.
   The use of Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) [RFC4211] was
   considered, but it was unclear if there was market demand for it.  If
   it is desired to support CRMF in the future, a backwards compatible
   solution can be defined at that time.

3.2.  No Support for Key Generation

   Early revisions of this document included "rpc" statements for
   generating symmetric and asymmetric keys.  These statements were
   removed due to an inability to obtain consensus for how to
   generically identify the key-algorithm key algorithm to use.  Hence, the solution
   presented in this document only supports keys to be configured via an
   external client.

   Separate protocol-specific modules can present protocol-specific key-
   generating RPCs (e.g., the "generate-public-key" "generate-asymmetric-key-pair" RPC in
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
   [RFC9644] and
   [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]). [RFC9645]).

3.3.  Unconstrained Public Key Usage

   This module defines the "public-key-grouping" grouping, which enables
   the configuration of public keys without constraints on their usage,
   e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used for (encryption, (e.g.,
   encryption, verification, or both).

   The "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping uses the aforementioned
   "public-key-grouping" grouping, grouping and carries the same traits.

   The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping uses the
   aforementioned "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby
   associated certificates MUST constrain the usage of the public key
   according to local policy.

3.4.  Unconstrained Private Key Usage

   This module defines the "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping,
   which enables the configuration of private keys without constraints
   on their usage, e.g., what operations the key is allowed to be used
   for (e.g., signature, decryption, or both).

   The "asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping" grouping uses the
   aforementioned "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping, whereby
   configured certificates (e.g., identity certificates) may constrain
   the use of the public key according to local policy.

3.5.  Cleartext Passwords and Keys

   The module contained within this document enables, only when specific
   "feature" statements are enabled, for the cleartext value of
   passwords and keys to be stored in the configuration database.
   Storing cleartext values for passwords and keys is NOT RECOMMENDED.

3.6.  Encrypting Passwords and Keys

   The module contained within this document enables cleartext passwords
   and keys to be encrypted via another key, either symmetric or
   asymmetric.  Both formats use a CMS structure (EncryptedData and
   EnvelopedData
   EnvelopedData, respectively), which allows any encryption algorithm
   to be used.

   To securely encrypt a password or key with a symmetric key, a proper
   block cipher mode mode, such as an AEAD Authenticated Encryption with
   Associated Data (AEAD) or CBC Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), MUST be used.
   This ensures that a random IV Initialization Vector (IV) is part of the
   input, which guarantees that the output for encrypting the same
   password or key still produces a different unpredictable ciphertext.
   This avoids leaking that some encrypted keys or passwords are the
   same and makes it much harder to pre-generate rainbow tables to brute force
   brute-force attack weak passwords.  The ECB Electronic Codebook (ECB)
   block cipher mode MUST NOT be used.

3.7.  Deletion of Cleartext Key Values

   This module defines storage for cleartext key values that SHOULD be
   zeroized when deleted, deleted so as to prevent the remnants of their
   persisted storage locations from being analyzed in any meaningful
   way.

   The cleartext key values are the "cleartext-symmetric-key" node
   defined in the "symmetric-key-grouping" grouping (Section 2.1.4.3)
   and the "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-key-
   pair-grouping" grouping ("Section (Section 2.1.4.6).

3.8.  Considerations for the "ietf-crypto-types" YANG Module

   This section follows is modeled after the template defined in Section 3.7.1
   of [RFC8407].

   The "ietf-crypto-types" YANG module in this document defines "grouping" statements
   that are designed to be accessed via YANG based YANG-based management protocols,
   such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040].  Both of these
   protocols have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS)
   with
   Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4252], TLS [RFC8446], and QUIC [RFC9000]) and
   mandatory-to-implement mutual authentication.

   The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
   provides the means to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured
   preconfigured subset of all available protocol operations and
   content.

   Since the module in this document only defines groupings, these
   considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
   use these groupings.

   Some of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module may be
   considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.  It
   is thus important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config,
   or notification) to these data nodes.  The following subtrees and
   data nodes have particular sensitivity/vulnerability:

   *  The "cleartext-password" node:

         The "cleartext-password" node defined in the "password-
         grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read operations
         such that, in normal use cases, it should never be returned to
         a client.  For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-
         all" has been applied to it.

   *  The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node:

         The "cleartext-symmetric-key" node defined in the "symmetric-
         key-grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read
         operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be
         returned to a client.  For this reason, the NACM extension
         "default-deny-all" has been applied to it.

   *  The "cleartext-private-key" node:

         The "cleartext-private-key" node defined in the "asymmetric-
         key-pair-grouping" grouping is additionally sensitive to read
         operations such that, in normal use cases, it should never be
         returned to a client.  For this reason, the NACM extension
         "default-deny-all" has been applied. applied to it.

   *  The "cert-data" node:

         The "cert-data" node, node defined in both the "trust-anchor-cert-
         grouping" and "end-entity-cert-grouping" groupings, groupings is
         additionally sensitive to read operations, as certificates may
         provide insight into which other resources/applications/servers
         this particular server communicates with, as well as
         potentially divulge personally identifying information (e.g.,
         end-entity certificates).  For this reason, the NACM extension
         "default-deny-all" has been applied. applied to it.

   All the writable data nodes defined by all the groupings defined in
   this module may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
   environments.  For instance, even the modification of a public key or
   a certificate can dramatically alter the implemented security policy.
   For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been
   applied to all the data nodes defined in the module.

   Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered
   sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.  It is thus
   important to control access to these operations.  These are the
   operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:

   *  generate-certificate-signing-request:  generate-csr:

         This "action" statement SHOULD only be executed by authorized
         users.  For this reason, the NACM extension "default-deny-all"
         has been applied.  Note that NACM uses "default-deny-all" to
         protect "RPC" "rpc" and "action" statements; it does not define,
         e.g., an extension called "default-deny-execute".

         For this action, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations assert
         channel binding [RFC5056], [RFC5056] so as to ensure that the application
         layer that sent the request is the same as the device
         authenticated when the secure transport layer was established.

4.  IANA Considerations

4.1.  The "IETF XML" IETF XML Registry

   This document registers one

   IANA has registered the following URI in the "ns" subregistry registry of the
   "IETF
   XML" registry XML Registry" [RFC3688].  Following the format in [RFC3688], the
   following registration is requested:

   URI:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
   Registrant Contact:  The IESG
   XML: N/A,  N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

4.2.  The "YANG YANG Module Names" Names Registry

   This document registers one

   IANA has registered the following YANG module in the "YANG Module
   Names" registry [RFC6020].  Following the format in [RFC6020], the following
   registration is requested:

      name:

   Name:  ietf-crypto-types
      namespace:
   Namespace:  urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types
      prefix:
   Prefix:  ct
      reference:
   Reference:  RFC AAAA 9640

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [ITU.X680.2021]
              International Telecommunication Union,
              ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
              Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1:2021, February 2021,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-202102-I>.

   [ITU.X690.2021]
              International Telecommunication Union,
              ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1:2021,
              February 2021,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690-202102-I>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC4252]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252>.

   [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
              January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC5915]  Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
              Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC6031]  Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
              (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type", RFC 6031,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6031, December 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6031>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
              RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.

   [RFC6991]  Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
              RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.

   [RFC7093]  Turner, S., Kent, S., and J. Manger, "Additional Methods
              for Generating Key Identifiers Values", RFC 7093,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7093, December 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7093>.

   [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
              RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8341]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
              Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

5.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
              Watsen, K., "YANG Data Types and Groupings for
              Cryptography", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-netconf-crypto-types-33, 1 March 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              crypto-types-33>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server]

   [HTTP-CLIENT-SERVER]
              Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP
              Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              netconf-http-client-server-19, 1 March 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              http-client-server-19>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
              Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore
              Operations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              netconf-keystore-34, 1 March
              netconf-http-client-server-23, 15 August 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              keystore-34>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]
              http-client-server-23>.

   [NETCONF-CLIENT-SERVER]
              Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
              client-server-35, 1 March
              client-server-37, 14 August 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              netconf-client-server-35>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server]
              netconf-client-server-37>.

   [RESTCONF-CLIENT-SERVER]
              Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
              client-server-35, 1 March 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              restconf-client-server-35>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
              Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and SSH
              Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              netconf-ssh-client-server-39, 1 March 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              ssh-client-server-39>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]
              Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients
              and TCP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server-23, 1 March 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              tcp-client-server-23>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]
              Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS
              Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              netconf-tls-client-server-40, 1 March 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              tls-client-server-40>.

   [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
              Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
              anchors-27, 1 March
              client-server-38, 14 August 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
              trust-anchors-27>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.
              restconf-client-server-38>.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5056]  Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
              Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5056>.

   [RFC5915]  Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
              Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5915>.

   [RFC6020]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
              the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.

   [RFC7317]  Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for
              System Management", RFC 7317, DOI 10.17487/RFC7317, August
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7317>.

   [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
              Protocol",

   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8040, 8259,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.

   [RFC8340]  Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
              BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.

   [RFC8342]  Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
              and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
              (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.

   [RFC8407]  Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of
              Documents Containing YANG Data Models", BCP 216, RFC 8407,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8407, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8407>.

Appendix A.  Change Log

A.1.  I-D to 00

   *  Removed groupings and notifications.

   *  Added typedefs for identityrefs.

   *  Added typedefs for other RFC 5280 structures.

   *  Added typedefs for other RFC 5652 structures.

   *  Added convenience typedefs for RFC 4253, RFC 5280, and RFC 5652.

A.2.  00 to 01

   *  Moved groupings from the draft-ietf-netconf-keystore here.

A.3.  01 to 02

   *  Removed unwanted "mandatory"

   [RFC8792]  Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and "must" statements.

   *  Added many new crypto algorithms (thanks Haiguang!)

   *  Clarified in asymmetric-key-pair-with-certs-grouping, Q. Wu,
              "Handling Long Lines in
      certificates/certificate/name/description, that if the name MUST
      NOT match the name of a certificate that exists independently in
      <operational>, enabling certs installed by the manufacturer (e.g.,
      an IDevID).

A.4.  02 to 03

   *  renamed base identity 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to
      'asymmetric-key-algorithm'.

   *  added new 'asymmetric-key-algorithm' identities for secp192r1,
      secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1.

   *  removed 'mac-algorithm' identities for mac-aes-128-ccm, mac-aes-
      192-ccm, mac-aes-256-ccm, mac-aes-128-gcm, mac-aes-192-gcm, mac-
      aes-256-gcm, and mac-chacha20-poly1305.

   *  for all -cbc and -ctr identities, renamed base identity
      'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to 'encryption-algorithm'.

   *  for all -ccm and -gcm identities, renamed base identity
      'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm' to 'encryption-and-mac-
      algorithm' and renamed the identity to remove the "enc-" prefix.

   *  for all the 'signature-algorithm' based identities, renamed from
      'rsa-*' to 'rsassa-*'.

   *  removed all Content of the "x509v3-" prefixed 'signature-algorithm' based
      identities.

   *  added 'key-exchange-algorithm' based identities for 'rsaes-oaep' Internet-Drafts and 'rsaes-pkcs1-v1_5'.

   *  renamed typedef 'symmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to
      'symmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.

   *  renamed typedef 'asymmetric-key-encryption-algorithm-ref' to
      'asymmetric-key-algorithm-ref'.

   *  added typedef 'encryption-and-mac-algorithm-ref'.

   *  Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and
      folding algorithm.

A.5.  03 to 04

   *  ran YANG module through formatter.

A.6.  04 to 05

   *  fixed broken symlink causing reformatted
              RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.

   [RFC9641]  Watsen, K., "A YANG module to not show.

A.7.  05 to 06

   *  Added NACM annotations.

   *  Updated Security Considerations section.

   *  Added 'asymmetric-key-pair-with-cert-grouping' grouping.

   *  Removed text from 'permanently-hidden' enum regarding such keys
      not being backed up or restored.

   *  Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description"
      statement to match copyeditor convention.

   *  Added an explanation to the 'public-key-grouping' and 'asymmetric-
      key-pair-grouping' statements as Data Model for why the nodes are not
      mandatory (e.g., because they may exist only in <operational>.

   *  Added 'must' expressions to the 'public-key-grouping' and
      'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' statements ensuring sibling nodes
      are either all exist or do not all exist.

   *  Added an explanation to the 'permanently-hidden' that the value
      cannot be configured directly by clients and servers MUST fail any
      attempt to do so.

   *  Added 'trust-anchor-certs-grouping' and 'end-entity-certs-
      grouping' (the plural form of existing groupings).

   *  Now states that keys created in <operational> by the *-hidden-key
      actions are bound to the lifetime of the parent 'config true'
      node, and that subsequent invocations of either action results in a failure.

A.8.  06 to 07

   *  Added clarifications that implementations SHOULD assert that
      configured certificates contain the matching public key.

   *  Replaced the 'generate-hidden-key' and 'install-hidden-key'
      actions with special 'crypt-hash' -like input/output values.

A.9.  07 to 08

   *  Removed the 'generate-key and 'hidden-key' features.

   *  Added grouping symmetric-key-grouping

   *  Modified 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' to have a 'choice'
      statement for the keystone module to augment into, as well as
      replacing the 'union' with leafs (having different NACM settings.

A.10.  08 to 09

   *  Converting algorithm from identities to enumerations.

A.11.  09 to 10

   *  All the below changes are to the algorithm enumerations defined in
      ietf-crypto-types.

   *  Add in support for key exchange over x.25519 and x.448 based on Truststore",
              RFC 8418.

   *  Add in SHAKE-128, SHAKE-224, SHAKE-256, SHAKE-384 and SHAKE 512

   *  Revise/add in enum of signature algorithm for x25519 and x448

   *  Add in des3-cbc-sha1 for IPSec

   *  Add in sha1-des3-kd for IPSec

   *  Add in definit 9641, DOI 10.17487/RFC9641, September 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9641>.

   [RFC9642]  Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for rc4-hmac and rc4-hmac-exp.  These two
      algorithms have been deprecated in a Keystore", RFC 8429.  But some existing
      draft in i2nsf may still want to use them.

   *  Add x25519 9642,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9642, September 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642>.

   [RFC9643]  Watsen, K. and x448 curve M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for asymmetric algorithms

   *  Add signature algorithms ed25519, ed25519-cts, ed25519ph

   *  add signature algorithms ed448, ed448ph

   *  Add in rsa-sha2-256 TCP Clients
              and rsa-sha2-512 TCP Servers", RFC 9643, DOI 10.17487/RFC9643,
              September 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9643>.

   [RFC9644]  Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for SSH protocols (rfc8332)

A.12.  10 to 11

   *  Added a "key-format" identity.

   *  Added symmetric keys to the example in Section 2.2.

A.13.  11 to 12

   *  Removed all non-essential (to NC/RC) algorithm types.

   *  Moved remaining algorithm types each into its own module.

   *  Added a 'config false' "algorithms-supported" list to each of the
      algorithm-type modules.

A.14.  12 to 13

   *  Added the four features: "[encrypted-]one-[a]symmetric-key-
      format", each protecting a 'key-format' identity of the same name.

   *  Added 'must' expressions asserting that the 'key-format' leaf
      exists whenever a non-hidden key is specified.

   *  Improved the 'description' statements and added 'reference'
      statements for the 'key-format' identities.

   *  Added a questionable forward reference to "encrypted-*" leafs in a
      couple 'when' expressions.

   *  Did NOT move "config false" alg-supported lists to SSH/TLS drafts.

A.15.  13 to 14

   *  Resolved the "FIXME: forward ref" issue by modulating 'must',
      'when', and 'mandatory' expressions.

   *  Moved the 'generatesymmetric-key' and 'generate-asymmetric-key'
      actions from ietf-keystore to ietf-crypto-types, now as RPCs.

   *  Cleaned up various description statements and removed lingering
      FIXMEs.

   *  Converted the "iana-<alg-type>-algs" YANG modules to IANA
      registries with instructions for how to generate modules from the
      registries, whenever they may be updated.

A.16.  14 to 15

   *  Removed the IANA-maintained registries for symmetric, asymmetric,
      and hash algorithms.

   *  Removed the "generate-symmetric-key" and "generate-asymmetric-key"
      RPCs.

   *  Removed the "algorithm" node in the various symmetric and
      asymmetric key groupings.

   *  Added 'typedef csr' and 'feature certificate-signing-request-
      generation'.

   *  Refined a usage of "end-entity-cert-grouping" to make the "cert"
      node mandatory true.

   *  Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.

A.17.  15 to 16

   *  Updated draft title (refer to "Groupings" too).

   *  Removed 'end-entity-certs-grouping' as it wasn't being used
      anywhere.

   *  Removed 'trust-anchor-certs-grouping' as it was no longer being
      used after modifying 'inline-or-truststore-certs-grouping' to use
      lists (not leaf-lists).

   *  Renamed "cert" to "cert-data" in trust-anchor-cert-grouping.

   *  Added "csr-info" typedef, to complement the existing "csr"
      typedef.

   *  Added "ocsp-request" and "ocsp-response" typedefs, to complement
      the existing "crl" typedef.

   *  Added "encrypted" cases to both symmetric-key-grouping and
      asymmetric-key-pair-grouping (Moved from Keystore draft).

   *  Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree
      diagrams].

   *  Updated the Security Considerations section.

A.18.  16 to 17

   *  [Re]-added a "Strength of Keys Configured" Security Consideration

   *  Prefixed "cleartext-" in the "key" and "private-key" node names.

A.19.  17 to 18

   *  Fixed issues found by the SecDir review of the "keystore" draft.

   *  Added "password-grouping", discussed during the IETF 108 session.

A.20.  18 to 19

   *  Added a "Unconstrained Public Key Usage" Security Consideration to
      address concern raised by SecDir of the 'truststore' draft.

   *  Added a "Unconstrained Private Key Usage" Security Consideration
      to address concern raised by SecDir of the 'truststore' draft.

   *  Changed the encryption strategy, after conferring with Russ
      Housley.

   *  Added a "password-grouping" example to the "crypto-types-usage"
      example.

   *  Added an "Encrypting Passwords" section to Security Consideration.

   *  Addressed other comments raised by YANG Doctor.

A.21.  19 to 20

   *  Nits found via YANG Doctors reviews.

   *  Aligned modules with `pyang -f` formatting.

A.22.  20 to 21

   *  Replaced "base64encodedvalue==" with "BASE64VALUE=".

   *  Accommodated SecDir review by Valery Smyslov.

A.23.  21 to 22

   *  fixup the 'WG Web' Clients and 'WG List' lines in YANG module(s)

   *  fixup copyright (i.e., s/Simplified/Revised/) in YANG module(s)

   *  added 'hidden-keys' feature.

A.24.  22 to 23

   *  Fixed an example to reference correct key.

   *  Fixed an example to not have line-returns around the encoding SSH
              Servers", RFC 9644, DOI 10.17487/RFC9644, September 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9644>.

   [RFC9645]  Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for
      a binary value.

A.25.  23 to 24

   *  Added mandatory leaf "csr-format" to action "generate-csr".

   *  s/certificate-signing-request/csr/g in the YANG module.

A.26.  24 to 25

   *  Updated per Shepherd reviews impacting the suite of drafts.

A.27.  25 to 26

   *  Updated per Shepherd reviews impacting the suite of drafts.

A.28.  26 to 27

   *  Updated per Tom Petch and AD reviews.

   *  Renamed numerous "feature" statements and some "grouping"
      statements (in YANG)

   *  Added "csr-format" and "p10-csr-format" identities to doc (they
      were already in YANG)

   *  Clarified that the 'rsa-private-key-format' TLS Clients and 'ec-private-key-
      format' formats must be encoded using DER

   *  Added 'if-feature cleartext-passwords' statement to 'case
      cleartext-password' in grouping 'password-grouping'.

   *  Added 'if-feature cleartext-keys' statement to 'case cleartext-
      key' in grouping 'symmetric-key-grouping'.

   *  Added 'if-feature cleartext-cleartext-private-keys' statement to
      'case cleartext-private-key' in grouping 'asymmetric-key-
      grouping'.

   *  Updated Section titles.

   *  Clarified Security Considerations about the "generate-public-key"
      RPCs.

A.29.  27 to 28

   *  Mostly addresses AD review comments.

   *  Also addresses on-list comment regarding public-keys being
      "mandatory true."

   *  Added note to Editor to fix line foldings.

   *  Factored 'private-key-grouping' from 'asymmetric-key-pair-
      grouping'.

   *  Made public-key in 'asymmetric-key-pair-grouping' be "mandatory
      false".

   *  Renamed 'encrypted-by-choice-grouping' to 'encrypted-by-grouping'.

A.30.  28 to 29

   *  Addresses Gen-ART review by Dale Worley.

   *  Addresses review by Tom Petch.

A.31.  29 to 30

   *  Addresses 1st-round of IESG reviews.

A.32.  30 to 32

   *  Addresses issues found in OpsDir of the ssh-client-server draft.

   *  Removed "Strength of Keys Conveyed" section.

   *  Renamed Security Considerations section s/Template for/
      Considerations for/

   *  Improved Security Consideration for 'cert-data' node.

A.33.  32 to 34

   *  Nothing changed.  Only bumped for automation... TLS
              Servers", RFC 9645, DOI 10.17487/RFC9645, September 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9645>.

   [W3C.REC-xml-20081126]
              Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C.M., Maler, E.,
              and F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0
              (Fifth Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium
              Recommendation REC-xml-20081126, November 2008,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/>.

Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following for lively discussions
   on list and in the halls (ordered by first name): Balázs Kovács,
   Carsten Bormann, Dale Worley, Eric Voit, Éric Vyncke, Francesca
   Palombini, Jürgen Schönwälder, Lars Eggert, Liang Xia, Martin
   Björklund, Mahesh
   Jethanandani, Martin Björklund, Murray Kucherawy, Nick Hancock, Orie
   Steele, Paul Wouters, Rich Salz, Rifaat Shekh-Yusef, Rob Wilton,
   Roman Danyliw, Russ Housley, Sandra Murphy, Tom Petch, Valery
   Smyslov, Wang Haiguang, Warren Kumari, and Zaheduzzaman Sarker.

Author's Address

   Kent Watsen
   Watsen Networks
   Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net